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V.

DE WITT ET AL.
Natural gas belongs to the owner of the land, and is a part of it, and, so long as
it is on or in it, is subject to his control; but when it escapes, and goes into other
land, or comes under another's control, the title of the former owner is gone.
If an adjoining or distant owner drills a well on his own land, and taps his
neighbor's vein of gas, so that it comes into his well and under his control, such
gas belongs to the owner of the well.
The owner of land, leasing it to another for the purpose of drilling gas wells
thereon, and reserving the right to till the soil, after the lessee has drilled a well
and has gas ready to flow into pipes byturning a valve, cannot claim that the lessee
is not in possession, and that he must resort to a court of law to establish his title
before a court of equity will interfere.
The grant by lease of a certain tract of land for the purpose of sinking and operating gas wells, "no wells to be drilled within 300 yards of the brick building"
on the tract, is a release of the right of the grantor to lease the land within such
3o0 yards, for the purpose of sinking and maintaining a gas well.
If both parties disregard the strict terms of a lease, respecting payment at the
lessor's request, and no attention is paid to a delay in part of a payment, and no
demand is made therefor by the lessor, such acts constitute a waiver of the right to
demand a forfeiture for non-payment.
A payee, by saying that it will be useless to exhibit the money to him, when the
money is present, waives his right thereafter to insist that no proper tender in that
respect was made.

Appeal from Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland
County.
Mkoorhead & Head, for appellant.
D. S. Atkinson, j. 1. Peoples, Fin. E. Williams, and, W A.
Griffith, for appellees.
J., November II, 1889. Complainants filed a
bill, setting forth a lease of land from Brown, one of the respondents, for oil and gas purposes; the expenditure of large sums
of money under the lease; a subsequent lease of the same land
by Brown to the othe'r respondents, who took with knowledge
of complainants' rights; and the entry by them with the intent
to drill a well upon the said land, and take gas, etc. The bill
concluded with an averment that such a well could be drilled
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and put in operation in about forty days, long before an adjudication could be had upon the rights of the parties, and that
thereby enormous waste would be committed upon the premises of complainants, and irreparable injury to their interests;
wherefore they prayed an injunction, etc. The answer of respondents substantially admitted all of the facts set up in the
bill, except that the well which they were about to drill was on
premises leased to complainants, and that irreparable injury to
complainants would result therefrom; and further setting up
that the lease to complainants had been forfeited for non-payment of certain moneys due thereunder.
Two issues, therefore, were raised by the pleadings: First,
whether the well contemplated by the respondents was upon
the leased land; and, secondly, whether there had been a forfeiture of the lease. The actual fact not being disputed, both
these issues really turned on the construction of the lease:
Under these issues the parties went on for some months, and
completed their evidence. When, however, the case came to
be argued before the master, the respondents took the ground
that the complainants, being out of possession, and their title
being disputed, had no standing in equity, but must first establish their rights at law. The learned master adopted this view,
found as a fact that complainants were out of possession, and
reported, as a conclusion of law therefrom, that the bill must
be dismissed. The Court below adopted this report with only
a formal opinion, expressing unwillingness to say the master
had erred.
The master finds formally that, "during several months prior
to the filing of the bill, Brown, claiming a forfeiture of said
lease, had taken full and absolute possession of the premises
and rights mentioned and granted in the lease." An examination, however, of the evidence fails to disclose a single fact on
which such a finding can be sustained. It rests entirely on a
misconception of the subject-matter of the possession in question, and the nature of the possession itself of which the subject-matter admitted. The subject of possession was not the
land, certainly not the surface. All of that, except the portions
actually necessary for operating purposes, was expressly reserved by the lease to Brown, the lessor. Except of such por-
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tions, the complainants had no possession that was not concurrent with that of the lessor, if, indeed, it could be called
possession of the land at all. Complainants' right in the surface of the land under the lease was rather in the nature of an
easement of entry and examination, with a right of possession
arising where a particular place of operation should be selected,
and the easement of ingress, egress, storage, transportation,
etc., during the continuance of the operation. The real subject
of possession to which complainant was entitled under the
lease, was the gas or oil contained in, or obtainable through,
the land.
The learned master says, gas is a mineral, and while in situ,
is part of the land, and therefore possession of the land is possession of the gas. But this deduction must be made with
some qualifications. Gas, it is true, is a mineral; but it is a
mineral with peculiar attributes, which require the application
of precedents arising out of ordinary mineral rights, with much
more careful consideration of the principles involved than of
the mere decisions. Water also is a mineral; but the decisions
in ordinary cases of mining rights, etc., have never been held
as unqualified precedents in regard to flowing, or even to percolating, waters.
Water and oil, and still more strongly gas, may be classed
by themselves, if the analogy be not too fanciful, as minerals
fere nature. In common with animals, and unlike other minerals, they have the power and the tendency to escape without
the volition of the owner. Their "fugitive and wandering existence within the limits of a particular tract was uncertain," as
said by Chief Justice AGNEW in Brown v. Vandegrift (1875), 80
Pa. 147, 148. They belong to the owner of the land, and are
part of it, so long as they are on or in it, and are subject to his
control; but when they escape, and go into other land, or
come under another's control, the title of the former owner is
gone. Possession of the land, therefore, is not necessarily
possession of the gas. If an adjoining, or even a distant,
owner, drills his own land, and taps your gas, so that it comes
into his well and under his control, it is no longer yours, but
his. And equally so as between lessor and lessee in the present
-case, the one who controls the gas-has it in his grasp, so to
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speak-is the one who has possession in the legal as well as
in the ordinary sense of the word.
Tested by these principles, there is not the slightest doubt
that the possession of the gas, as well as the right to it under
this lease, was in the complainants when the bill was filed.
They had put down a well, which had tapped the gas-bearingstrata,and it was the only one on the land. They had it in
their control, for they had only to turn a valve, to have it flowinto their pipe, ready for use. The fact that they did not keep.
it flowing, but held it generally in reserve, did not affect their
possession any more than a mill-owner affects the continuance
of his water-right when he shuts his sluice-gates. On the
other hand, Brown had no possession of the gas at all. His
possession of the soil for purposes of tillage, etc., gave him no.
actual possession of the gas; and he had no legal possession,
for his lease had conveyed that to another. How, then, had
he taken "full and absolute possession of the premises and
rights," as found by the master? Apparently, he had asserted
to the complainants his claim that the lease was forfeited. In
addition, on one occasion, when the agent of complainants was
at their well for a specific purpose, Brown had ordered him offthe land; but there is no evidence that he went until he had
finished his business there. Shortly before this the complanants had sent men on the land to begin the erection of a derrick
for a second well, and Brown had ordered them off This,
which is the strongest item in the proof, is really no evidence
at all of dispossession of complainants. They still remain in
possession of their Well, which gave them the sole control ofthe gas, so far as its utilization was concerned, and the sole
possession of which it was capable, apart from the land, from
which it had been legally severed by the lease. The utmost
that can be said of such an occurrence is that it was a violent
and temporary interference with that portion of complainants
rights which authorized them to put down a second well.
This was no more a dispossession of complainants from their
occupation of the gas than blocking up one of a farmer's roads
to his home would be an ouster from his farm. We are therefore of opinion that the master was wrong in finding as a fact
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that complainants were out of possession, and should be remitted to an ejectment to establish their title at law.
As to the other objections to the jurisdiction of equity, they
require but a brief notice. The bill is a bill to stay waste, and
that the damage threatened, even if not irreparable, is entirely
incapable of measurement at law, cannot be seriously questioned. Such cases were among the earliest, and have always
been among the most incontestable, within the chancellor's
jurisdiction. It is superfluous to cite authorities for so familiar
a principle, but I may refer to Allison's Appeal (1875), 77 Pa.
221, as a recent case in this Court, where the invasion restrained,
was of complainants' right to oil, a fluid far more capable of
accurate measurement than gas.
The learned master having come to the conclusion that the
bill should be dismissed for want of equity, forbore to consider
and pass upon the substantial issues raised by the pleadings.
But as "the evidence was fully taken by both parties before him,
and he has found all the facts necessary to a final determination of the whole controversy, we will proceed to consider it.
The actual facts, as already said, are not disputed, and both
issues substantially depend upon the construction of the lease.
We have therefore to consider-First, whether the well
threatened to be put down by respondents was upon the leased
land. Of this there cannot be the slightest doubt. The lease
is of "all that certain tract of land," etc. This means the whole
tract. The grant is limited as to the intention "for the sole
and only purpose of drilling and operating wells," etc., but is
not limited as to territory. Following the description of the
tract is the clause on which respondents rely- No wells to be drilled within three hundred yards of the brick building belonging to J. H. Brown."

The well which respondents propose to bore is within this
prohibited distance; and the respondents claim that Brown,
and they as his lessees, have the right to drill wells within
that part of the territory. But the clause in question is
neither a reservation nor an exception as to the land, but a
limitation as to the privilege granted. It does not, in any
way, diminish the area of the land leased,-that is still the
whole tract; but it restricts the operations of the lessees in
VOL. XXXVIII.-7
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putting down wells to the portions outside of the prohibited distance. For right of way and other purposes of the
lease, excepting the location of wells, the space inside the
stipulated line is as much leased to the lessee as any other
part of the tract. The terms of the grant would imply the
reservation to the lessor of the possession of the soil for
purposes other than those granted to the lessee, and the parties have expressed what otherwise would have been implied
by the provision that the lessor is to fully use and enjoy the
said premises for the purpose of tillage, except such part as
shall be necessary for said operating purposes.
From the nature of gas and gas operations, already discussed, the grant of well-rights is necessarily exclusive. It
was so held even as to oil-wells, in Funk v. -aldeman (1867),
53 Pa. 229, 247, 248, although, in that case, the plaintiff had a
mere license to enter, etc., and not, as complainants here, a
lease of the land; and it is exclusive, in the present case, over
the whole tract. As already said, the clause relative to the
3oo-yards distance was a restriction on the privilege granted,
not a reservation of any land, or any boring rights, to the
lessor; and a well upon the prohibited portion was just as
damaging to the lessees as upon any other portion of the tract.
The drilling of the well threatened by respondents, is therefore in violation of the lease, and should be enjoined if the
lease is still in force.
Secondly, has there been a forfeiture of the lease? It is
claimed by respondents on account of the failure of the lessee
to make certain stipulated payments. The lease is dated
December 7, 1885, and by its terms the lessee was to pay $500
a year for each gas-well, payable quarterly, in advance, from
the completion of each and every well; and in case one well
should not be completed within three months from the date of
the lease, then to pay
,,
For such delay the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars every three
months from the date of this agreement; * * * and [lessor] agrees to accept
such sum as full consideration and payment for such delay until one well shall be
completed; and a failure to complete one-well, or to make any of such payments,
within such time and at such place as above mentioned, renders this lease null
and joid. * * * It is further agreed that if any of the within payments remain
mnpaid thirty days, then this lease to be null and void."
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These are all the provisions which bear upon the present
question, and their effect is entirely clear. One well is to be
completed in three months, and the rent is to begin from its
completion. This is the primary intent and expectation of
the parties. But, if not so completed, then the lessee is to
pay a like amount from the date of the agreement, until one
well is completed, and thereafter, of course, the payments are
not to be for delay at the end of each three months, but
as rent, quarterly, in advance. A failure to pay any of the
sums due for a period of 30 days, is to render the lease null
and void. The first provision for forfeiture cannot be read
literally and separately, as it is in manifest conflict with the
other covenants. Thus it invokes a f6rfeiture for failure to
complete one well in three months, but in so doing it is repugnant to the agreement to accept the stipulated "full consideration and the payment for delay." Again, it imposes the forfeiture for failure to make any of the payments at the time and
place mentioned, and in so doing is in conflict with the subsequent agreement that the forfeiture shall only be for a default
of 30 days. Reading all these clauses together, therefore, as
we are bound to do, the last-mentioned clause, calling for a
forfeiture upon a default of 3o days in the payments, is the
only one that is effective for the purpose of forfeiture.
Before passing to the acts of the parties, it may be well to
notice very briefly the construction of the agreement set up
by the respondents in their answer, though not pressed in their
argument. It is that the default in payment ipso facto created
a forfeiture; or, in other words, that the forfeiture was absolute
and self-operating, without regard to the acts or wishes
of the parties. Such a construction is utterly untenable. It is
contrary, not only to the settled rules of law, but to the manifest intentions of the parties. This question is definitively
settled in Wills v. Gas Co. (at the present term, Nov. I I, 1889),
the opinion in which is filed herewith by our Brother CLARK.
Coming now to the facts as reported by the master and
practically undisputed, we find that the parties from the outset, entirely disregarded the strict times and terms of payment, as set out in the lease. On the day following the date
of the lease, the lessees paid $25o on account. It is admitted
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that such payment was made, and that it was a voluntary advance, as nothing was or would be due under the lease for
three m6nths, and then only half that amount. In June, another payment of $250 was made, and this, again, was more
than was due under any possible construction of the lease. *A
quarterly payment for delay had become due on March 7,
i886. The well being completed April 23,there would, under
the construction contended for by the lessor, then be due compensation for the 46 days of additional delay, amounting to
$65, and a quarter's rent in advance, which latter was covered
by the advance of $250 in the previous December. The June
payment, therefore, fully covered this $65, another quarter's
rent from July 23 to October 23, and an advance of $6onearly one-half the quarter's rent that would become due in
October, four months later. This calculation, as already said,
is upon the most favorable possible construction for the lessor. But in fact there is not the slightest doubt that both
parties entirely disregarded the strict terms of the lease as to
times of payment, and treated the payments of December and
June as semi-annual advances of the stipulated sum, no matter
whether called "compensation for delay" or "rent," as the
amounts in either case were exactly the same. Neither party
paid the least attention to the possible fag end of a quarter's
delay, the lessor never demanded it, no reference to it was
made at the time of the June payment, and it made its appearance in the transactions months later as an after-thought.
Forfeitures, if no longer odious-and I for one am too
strongly in favor of the enforcement of contracts as parties
make them, to apply harsh names to strict constructions-are
yet not favored, either at law or equity, and among the least
favored have always been those fqunded on mere delay in the
payment of money. In this case, there is not the slightest
pretense of any other ground for forfeiture, than the failure to
pay a small amount of money in advance. As already shown,
not a single payment .under this lease was made strictly according to its terms; the departure was begun by the lessor's
request, and was always in his favor. To allow him now to
turn around without notice and enforce a forfeiture for a fail-
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ure of the insignificant proportions shown, would be sanctioning a fraud such as no court has ever permitted.
There is another ground equally fatal. Forfeitures are
always strictly construed; and, looking at the facts, none has
been incurred here, even on respondent's own view of the
amounts due. As already seen, the June payment, deducting
the $65 for delay, still paid the quarter's rent beginning July
23, and nearly half of -the quarter beginning October 23,
i886. Under the lease, a forfeiture would not be incurred unless a payment should remain unpaid for 3o days. On October
23, a quarter's rent was due in advance, but only half of it was
unpaid, for half of it had been paid in advance in the preceding
June. The lease does not provide a forfeiture for failure
to pay a balance, but only "if any of the within payments
remain unpaid," which ieans a whole payment, not a balance
on a running account. No forfeiture, therefore, was incurred,
or could be, until the next payment should become due and
be unpaid for*30 days. The next quarter day was January 23,
1887; and a week before that date, on January i5, the lessees tendered the rent to Brown, and it was refused. The
master's findings of fact, under the view he took, do not extend to the occurrences of January 15, 1887; but the testimony was taken by both parties, and leaves no doubt that
there was a valid tender. Both Rhodes and Webb say the
money was held in one hand, where Brown could see it, while
the voucher was read to him; and Brown himself says
Rhodes told him he had come to pay, though he did not actually see the money, and that he told Rhodes it would "be
altogether unnecessary" to show the money. This, urder the
circumstances, dispensed with further formalities. Whether,
therefore, we regard the strict conditions of the lease as waived
by the conduct of the parties, or the failure in payment as
only a partial and incomplete default, it is equally clear that
there was no forfeitiure, and the respondents have failed to
show any defense to the bill.
The decree is reversed, the bill reinstated, and the injunction reinstated, made perpetual, and directed to be so issued;
costs to be paid by the appellees; and the record is remitted
to the Court below to execute this order.
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NOTE.-The analogy between natural gas and petroleum is so striking that
we propose to cite cases respecting both
of them.
An "Internal
Improvement"Right ofEminent Domain. AnAct of
West Virginia (Act of February 27,
1867; Laws of 1867, Ch. 95, P.110;
amended February 26, 1868; Laws of
1868, Ch. 67, p. 63) created a corporation "to lay out and construct or
cause to be laid -out and constructed and
maintained a line or lines of tubing, for
the purpose of transporting petroleum
or other oils through pipes of iron or
other materials," in certain counties,
"to any railroad or other roads, or to
any navigable stream or streams in or
adjoining" the counties named, "and
to transport from the termini of said
pipe or pipes, petroleum or other oils
in tank cars, boats or other receptacles
belonging to said company." The Act
established the maximum charges the
company could make for transportation.
This was a special Act; and the Constitution (of x863) provided that "The
Legislature shall pass general laws
whereby any number of persons, associating for mining, manufacturing, insuring, or other purpose, useful to the
public, excepting banks of circulation,
and the construction of works of internal improvement, may become a corporation," etc.
The Court held that this company
was engaged in a work of "internal
improvement," and its charter authorized by the Constitution : West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Volcanic
Oil and Coal Co. (1872), 5 W. Va.
382.
The transportation and supply of
natural gas for public consumption is
recognized as a public use in Pennsylvania; and the right of eminent domain granted to such corporations by the
Act of 1885, is within the constitutional
power of the Legislature to grant. "It

is a curious objection to set up against
the Act of 1885, in view of the present
consumption of natural gas, that its use
is not a public one, and that, therefore,
those corporations which are engaged
in its transportation, may not be vested
with the right of eminent domain. As
well might this objection be urged
against the vesting of this power in
those companies which have been incorporated for the purpose of supplying
our towns and villages with water, in
which the public interest is found not
in the transportation, but in the use of
that fluid, after it has, by these agencies,
been transported. Nor would it seem
to us as of the slightest materiality that
the water thus produced, had been
drawn from a simple spring, well or
basin. Just so with natural gas; it has
become a public necessity, but as it
cannot be used except it be piped to
the manufactories and residences of the
people, it follows that as the piping of
it is necessary to its use, the means so
used for its transportation must be of
prime importance to the public, and
directly affect its welfare:" Per Curiam, Johnstonv. Peo,le'sNaturalGas
Co. (Sup. Ct. Pa., Nov. 15, 1886). To
the same effect, Bloomifield & Rochester
Natural Gas-Light Co. v. Richardson
(1872), 63 Barb. (N. V.) 437; Appeal
of Pittsburgh (1886), 115 Pa. 4; Carothersv. PhiladelphiaCo. (888), i8
Id. 468.
[The Pennsylvania Act of 1885 (P.
L. pp. 33-35) provides-" SECTION io.
The transportation and supply of natural gas for public consumption, is hereby
declared to be a public use, and it shall
be the duty of corporations, organized
or provided for under this Act, to furnish to consumers along their lines and
within their respective districts, natural
gas for heat, or light, or other purposes,
as the corporation may determine. Any
and all corporations that is, or are now,
or shall hereafter be engaged in such
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business, shall have the right of eminent domain for the laying of pipe lines
for the transportation and distribution
of natural gas; tile right, however, shall
not be exercised as to any burying
ground or dwelling, passenger railroad
station-house, or any shop or manufactory in which steam or fire is necessarily used for manufacturing or repairing purposes, but shall include the right
to appropriate land upon or under which
to lay said lines and locate pipes upon
or over, under and across, any lands,
rivers, streams, bridges, roads, streets,
lanes, alleys, or other public highways,
or other pipe lines, or to cross railroads
or canals: Provided, In case the pipe
lines cross any railroad, operated by
steam, or canal, the same shall be located
under such railroad or canal, and in
such manner as the railroad or canal
company may reasonably direct. And
.providedfurther, That any company
-laying a pipe line under the provisions
hereof, shall be liable for all damages
occasioned by reason of the negligence
of such gas company: And trovided
further, That no company authorized
by this Act, shall have the right to oc-cupy longitudinally, the right of way,
road bed, or bridge of any railroad
company: Andprovided, If any pipe
line laid under the provisions of this
Act, or laid upon or over lands cleared
and used for agricultural purposes, the
same shall be buried at least twentyfour inches below the surface, and if
any line of pipe shall be laid over or
through any waste or woodland, which
shall be changed to farming land, then
it shall be the duty of the corporation
to immediately bury the said pipe to the
depth of at least twenty-four inches as
aforesaid.
Prior to any appropriation, the corporation shall attempt to agree with the
owner as to the damage properly payable for an easement in his or her property, if such owner can be found and
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is suijuris,failing to agree, the corporation shall tender to the property owner
a bond with sufficient sureties to secure
him or her in the payment of damages;
if the owner refuse to accept said bond
or cannot be found or is not sui juris,
the same shall then be presented to the
Court of Common Pleas of the proper
county, after reasonable notice to the
property owner, by advertisement or
otherwise to be approved by it. Upon
the approval of the bond, and its being
filed, the right of the corporation to
enter upon the enjoyment of its easement shall be complete. Upon petition
of either the property owner or the corporation, thereafter, the Court of Common
Pleas shall appoint five disinterested
freeholders of the county to serve as
viewers to assess the damages properto
be paid to the property owner, for the
easement appropriated by the company,
and shall fix a time for their meeting of
which notice shall be given to both
parties.
Either party may appeal from the
report of the viewers, within twenty
days after the filing thereof, to the Court
of Common Pleas, and have a jury trial
as in ordinary cases, and writ of error
to the Supreme Court.
SECTION II. The right to enter upon

any public lane, street, alley, or highway, for the purpose of laying down
pipes, altering, inspecting, and repairing the same, shall be exercised in such
way as to do as little damage as possible to such highway, and to impair as
little as possible the free use thereof,
subject to such regulations as the councils of any city may by ordinance adopt.
SECTION 12. In all cases where any
dispute shall arise between such corporations and the authorities of any
borough, city, township or county,
through, over or upon whose highways,
or between it and any land owner or
corporation, through,over or upon whose
property or easement, pipes are to be
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laid, as to the manner of laying the
pipes, and the character thereof, with
respect to safety and public convenience,
it shall be the duty of the Court of
Common Pleas of the proper county,
upon the petition of either party to the
dispute, upon a hearing to be had, to
define by its decree, what precautions,
if any, shall be taken in the laying of
pipes, and, by injunction, to restrain
their being laid in any other way than
as decreed. It shall be the duty of the
,court to have the hearing adid make its
decree with all convenient speed and
promptness. Either party shall have a
right to appeal therefrom, as in cases of
equity, to the Supreme Court, but the
appeal shall not be a sujpersedeasof the
decree, and proceedings shall be had in
like manner upon like petition, when
and as often as any dispute arises as to
pipes already laid, to define the duty of
such corporation as to their re-laying,
repair, amendment, or improvement.
SECTION 13. Companies incorporated
under this Act, and not referred to or
included in the next succeeding section
hereof, shall not enter upon or lay down
their pipes or conduits on any street or
highway of any borough or city of this
Commonwealth, without the assent of
the councils of such borough or city by
ordinance, duly passed and approved."
[Section fourteen provides for the
acceptance of the provisions of this Act
by corporations theretofore incorporated,
under certain restrictions contained in
this and the two following sections.
[Sections one to eleven provide for
incorporation of natural gas companies,
and section seventeen for the consolidation of existing corporations. Sections
eighteen to the end relate to injuries to
works, and to plugging wells.
A statute of Pennsylvania (Act of
April 24, 1874, P. L. 70 4) provided
"that every railroad company, coal
company, steamboat company, slackwater navigation company, transporta-

lion co npany, street passenger company," etc., operating "any railroad,
canal, slackwater navigation, or street
passenger railway, or device for the
transportation of freight or passengers,"
should be subject to pay into the State
Treasury a certain tax. Under this law,
a petroleum company, conveying oil
from wells to tanks and reservoirs by
means of pipes, were liable to the
tax, as a "transportation company,"
transporting freight: Columbia Conduit
Co. v. Commonwealth (1879), 90 Pa.
307; Aippeal of the City of.Pitsburgh
(1888), 123 Id. 374.
An Act, passed long before natural
gas was in use (Act of April 7, 1870,
P. L. 1O26,

2), authorized the forma-

tion of a company to buy, maintain, or
manage in its own name, "any work or
works, public or private, which may
tend or be designed to improve, indorse,
facilitate, or develop, trade, travel, or
the transportation and conveyance of
freight, live stock, passengers, or any
other traffic, by land or water, from or
to any part of the United States." It
was held that this authorized the formation of a company to transport natural gas; and the powers of eminent
domain given by the statute (, 4), empowered the company to condemn a
right of way for a pipe line: Carothers
v. Pkiladejohia Co. (1888), iiS Pa.
468.
Incororation under General Laws.
The General Corporation Act of
Pennsylvania (April 29, 1874, P. L. 73),
provides for incorporation for ( 42,
clause 2, page 74), "XI. The manufacture and supply of gas, or the supply
of light or heat to the public by any other
means." Their powers were defined
to be (34, P. 93),-" C -ause
. Where
any such company shall be incorporated
as a gas company, or company for the
supply of heat or light to the public, it
shall have authority to supply with gas
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light, the borough, town, city or district where it may be located, and such
persons, partnerships and corporations
residing therein, or adjacent thereto, as
may desire the same, at such price as
may be agreed upon, and also to make,
erect and maintain therein the necessary buildings, machinery and apparatus
for manufacturing gas, heat or light
from coal, or other material, and distributing the same, with the right to
enter upon any public street, lane, alley,
or highway, for the purpose of laying
,down pipes, altering, inspecting, and
repairing the same, doing as little damage to said streets, lanes, alleys and
'highways, and impairing the free use
thereof as little as possible, and subject
to such regulations as the councils of
said borough, town, city or district may
adopt in regard to grades, or for the
protection and convenience of public
-travel over the same."
In denying the right of a natural gas
company to become incorporated under
this statute, GREEN, J., Emerson v.
Comm. (1884), ioS Pa. 111, 125, 126,

said--" It seems to us plain that the
-words of this section contemplate, and
authorize, the creation of corporations for
the manufacture and supply of gas, and
the supply of light or heat, by any other
means. Of course the only kind of
gas companies that are authorized, are
those which manufacture gas, and this
necessarily excludes corporations for
supplying natural gas, that being a product of nature, and not the result of
any manufacturing process. The other
companies authorized, are those for supplying light or heat, produced by any
other means. * * * The furnishing of natural gas is not the furnishing
of heat. Natural gas is not heat. It is
a fuel, a substance which may be converted into heat by combustion with
atmospheric air. When gas is delivered
to the consumer, it is still gas only. It
is not heat." In denying a re-argu-

et at.

ment, the said justice said-" Counsel
are in error, in supposing that we decided that the Act of 1874 did not authorize the incorporation of companies
for furnishing heat from natural gas.
We carefully distinguished between
charters for furnishing heat and those
for furnishing natural gas itself; and
we expressly declined to declare the respondent's charter void because it was
a charter to furnish heat:" p. 127.
Use of Public Street, or Country Highway.
(See page 115, infra.)
The laying of natural gas pipes in a
public highway is an additional burden
upon the easement; and cannot be
done without the payment of damages
for the privilege.
A court of equity will restrain the
laying of such pipe until the damages
are assessed and paid: Sterling's Afteal (1SS5), 11 Pa. 35; Z re Bloomfield and Rochester Natural Gas Light
Co. (I875), 62 N. Y. 386; s. c. below,
Bloomfield and Rochester NraturalGas
Light Co. v. Richardson (1872), 63
Barb. (N. Y.) 437. This rule hasbeen
applied by the Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, even to a street in
a city: Webb v. Ohio Gas Fuel Co.
(1886) 16 Weekly L. Bull. 121, following The Lawrence R. R. Co. v. Williams (1878), 85 Ohio St. 168.
Use of a Railroad'sRight 9f Way.
When a railroad company does not
take the land condemned, in fee, the
original owner may lawfully enter upon
the road-bed and lay an oil or gas pipe
line under the railroad track: Hasson
v. Oil Creek and Allegheny River R.
R. Co. (1871), 8 Phila. 556.
Ejechment.
"The plaintiff insists that the agreement amounts to a sale of the oil [in
the ground] itself, and that the oil, being a part of the land, in a corporeal
hereditament, to recover possession of
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which ejectment will lie. But if it be
sult according to the terms of the
agreement, is perpetual and irrevocconceded that by the contract, there
able: Rynd v. Rynd Farm Oil Co.
was a grant of the oil, it by no means
(187o), 63 Pa. 397.
follows from that alone that ejectment
is maintainable. Oil is a fluid like.
An agreement was to lease "the exwater; it is not the subject of property, clusive right and privilege of boring for
salt, oil or minerals upon his farm * *
except while in actual occupancy. A
grant of water has long fleen con- upon which the first party now resides,
* with the right of access to and
sidered not to be a grant of anything
for which an ejectment will lie. It is
from such places as may be selected by
not a grant of the soil upon which the the party of the second part; * * *
water rests:" Dark v.Johnson (1867),
said boring to be done so as to do the
55 Pa. 164.
least possible injury to the farm," for a
But where the lease of land was for
consideration of 515o, and one third of
"the sole and exclusive right to bore or
the product. Holes were to be sunk to
dig for oil * * and gather and colsatisfy the parties as to practicability and
lect the same * * for the term of
profit for oil. This created an incortwenty years," and for "the sole and
poreal hereditament, and the only posand exclusive right to mine for coal,
session of the grantee was such as was
iron-ore and all other minerals, which necessary for the enjoyment of the
may be obtained on said lands," the
right; the remedy for disturbance of
lease vested in the lessee a corporeal in- the right was case, and not ejectment:
terest for which ejectment would lie :
Union .PetroleumCo. v. Oliver .PetroBarker v. Dale (1870), 3 Pitts. (Pa.)
leum Co. (1872), 72 Pa. 173.
19o [and a receiver will not be ap[In PAillips v. Coast, decided by the
pointed, unless under urgent and pe- Supreme Court of Pa., January 6, i89o
culiar circumstances] : Ckicago, etc.,
(25 W. N. C. 275), defendants had bona
Oil and Alining Co. v. U S. Petroleum fide, and, by mistake, sunk a well on
Co. (1868), 57 Pa. 83.
plaintiffs' land, for the purpose of boring
A. granted to B. the exclusive right
for, and extracting oil. Plaintiffs brought
of boring for oil on a certain farm,. re- an action of ejectment, and a receiver
serving the right to farm the surface; if was appointed to keep an account of
the boring proved profitable, the conthe product of the well during the contract was to be construed as a perpetual
tinuance of the suit. The Court held
lease; if otherwise, possession was to that the defendants were entitled to
revert to A. On a part of the farm the compensation, for their expenses in sinkboring proved profitable. A. brought
ing such well, out of the proceeds of
suit, alleging that the boring had not
the oil produced. GREEN, J., "This
been profitable on another part of the is a kind of improvement of an unfarm, and asked judgment for posses- usual character, and one which parsion of that part. The Court held that ticularly commended itself to the fayejectment would not lie to test A's
orable opinion of the Courts. It was
right to bore for oil; but it would lie,
an oil well with all the machinery and
under the agreement, if B. had occu- appliances necessary to its operation.
pied the land for other purposes, or to
Now without this well and machinery
an extent greater than allowed by the the oil could not possibly be obtained.
contract, or if the license was revocable,
After it was completed, its operations
or had been forfeited by B. The license,
were all for the benefit of the plaintiffs.
* * * Obtaining oil from the bowels of
when made effectual by a successful re-
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the earth is a very different thing from
obtaining crops from the surface of the
ground. The oil only exists at a distance of hundreds of feet below the
surface. If it is not developed by means
of wells, it is the same as if it had no
existence at all. It is in a state of nature, of no use or value whatever to the
owner of the land. * * * Therefore it
is no hardship whatever to them, to repay to the defendants the bare cost of
the well and appliances which belong
to the plaintiffs now, and the whole
benefits of which accrue to them alone.
* * * The proposition that oil is part
of the land, and cannot be regarded as
mesne profits, and hence the right to
compensation for valuable improvements, has no application. The oil has
been taken. It is not a question of
staying waste, but of allowance for the
cost of valuable improvements actually
necessary and made in good faith. For
such improiements, compensation is allowed, whether that which is taken be
mineral oil or other substance of the
land or not :" Kille v. Ege (1876), 82
Pa. 102 and Eg'e v. Mille (877), 84
Pa. 333, followed.
Liability.for Negligence.
A natural gas company is not liable
for injuries resulting from the negligence
of an independent contractor, occurring
before acceptance of his work; unless
work is accepted which the company
knew, or ought to have known, had
been performed in an unsafe and dangerous manner: Charliers Valley Gas
Co. V. Waters (1888), 123 Pa. 220;
Same v. Lynlz (1888), itS Id. 362.
The tenth section of the Act of I85
(supra,p. 102) was held, in these cases,
to impose no duty, "no express or definite obligation" as regards what work
should be done, or how: per HAxiD, J.,
123 Pa. 230.
One taking gas from a natural gas
company assumes only the usual and

ordinary risks of such use, but not extraordinary risks caused by the negligence
of the company: Oil City Fuel Sz1pply
Co. v. Boundy (I888), 122 Pa. 449.
A gas company may not lay its pipe
on the bottom of a navigable river, without incurring the risk of liability for
accidents caused thereby; as where a
boat ran on to such a pipe by accident,
broke it, and the escaping gas caught
fire from the boat's furnace and burned
it up: Orinslaer v. Philadelpia Co.
(I887), U.S. Dist. Ct., W. Dist. Pa., 31
Fed. Repr. 354Regulation by a Munici.ality.
[Under Sections Eleven and Thirteen
of the Act of 1885 (supra,pp. 103, I04),

City "Councils are authorized to give,
or withhold their .assent, without more.
They have no right to couple their
assent with any condition, or restriction,
not imposed by the Act, unless the
company agrees to accept the same, and
be bound thereby; and even then the
conditions, or restrictions, so accepted
by the company, must harmonize and
in nowise conflict with the provisions of
the Act. * * * In view of the limited
authority delegated to Councils, it is a
grave mitake to assume, as they appear
to have done in this case, that they have
power to legislate on any and everything
connected directly, or indirectly, with
the general subject:" STERRErT, J.,
ApPealof City of Pillsu;gh(z$S6),11 5
Pa. 4.
[The Councils of the City of Pittsburgh, under tLis authority, passed two
ordinances, of August 10, 1885, and
December 29, 1885, and the following
sections were declared void, in the case
cited above:
i. That the City Engineer should
control the work of laying pipes, to the
exclusion of the company.
2. That the pipes should be tested;
because indefinite as to how, when, or
by whom the test was to be made.
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3. That a formal acceptance be made
by the company of the ordinance, especially as to those provisions illegal and
void.
4. That the company should submit
to the city " plans, methods, specifications, and estimates" for the acceptance
or refusal of the Commissioner of Highways, wuh appeal to the Councils, whose
action was to be final, when the statute
provided for an appeal to the court.
Also a provision requiring such plans,
on any extension of the pipes.
5. That a showing be made, under
oaths of the names of the stockholders,
the amount of stock held by each, and
that at least fiftyper cent. had been paid
up, of each subscription, in cash, or, if
such is not the case, in what paid; and
that no permit be issued unless such
Commissioner of Highways is satisfied
that there is enough paid up capital to
,complete the work in accordance with
the plans submitted.
6. That a transfer of the privileges of
the company to any other corporation
be forbidden, under a penalty of a forfeiture of its privileges and all its property, without the assent in majority in
value of its stockholders, and the approval of the Council.
7. That the company furnish, upon
request of either branch of the Council's
street committee, or by the Mayor, City
Attorney and City Controller, or any two
of them, with the City Controller, a
sworn statement of its stockholders, that
they hold stock in good faith for themselves and not for others, or, if held by
trustees, the names of the persons for
whom held, requiring the company to
demand this information upon receiving
for registry a transfer of the stock.
8. That the City be relieved from liability in case of any neglect of the corporation,resulting in damages to person
or property.
9. That a consolidation be forbidden,
in any way whatever, of the company

with any other company, when a statute
expressly authorized a consolidation
upon certain terms.
1o. That the City Engineer, in case
the company employ careless, incompetent or unskilful men, might discharge
such men, and take charge of the work,
and complete it, requiring the company
to pay estimates in advance for two
squares at a time, or the imposition of a
forfeiture, in case of a neglect, or refusal,
for fifteen days.
Ii. Thatthecompanyfurnish abond,
conditioned for a faithful compliance
with the prnvisions of the ordinance,
and to indemnify the City against all
loss, costs, suits, damages and expenses
arising from the company's occupation
and use of the streets.
The following provisions were held
valid:
i. Fixing the depth to which the
pipes should be laid, and ,allowing the
City Engineer to designate what portion
of the street should be occupied.
2. Requiring the company, when asking the permit, to submit to the Commissioner of Highways a plan and full
specifications, showing the streets proposed to be opened, the location, kind
and size of pipes.
3. Requiring the "system" to be approved by the City Engineer and natural
gas committee of Councils, of escape
pipes sufficient to carry off any and all
gas which may leak or escape; gauges
showing the pressure, open at all times
to inspection, at points designated by
the City Engineer; and that suitable
means be used to protect pipes laid,
where there are cinders or other injurious material.
4. Requiring that no pipes be laid
between November 15 and April 15 .
5. Authorizing the Commissioner of
Highways to refuse, in his discretion,
permission, if in his judgment the location proposed upon any highway, is
injurious to the City; to require altera-

NATURAL GAS CO. V. DE WITT et a.

tions of the plans submitted; to limit the
number of pipes upon any highway to
two trunk lines of competing companies.
6. Requiring the company to pay the
expense of repaving, or keeping in repair, for nine months, the streets opened
for laying pipes, and that estimates for
the cost thereof, for each section, not
exceeding two squares, be furnished
such Commissioner, and payment of the
amount made to him, before permit issued for opening such squares: A#eal
of City of Pittsburgh(x886), 115 Pa. 4The Pennsylvania Act of 1885 (proviso to section 2, P. L., p. 31) forbids
the granting, by any borough or city, to
any natural gas company, the exclusive
privilege to occupy the streets of such
borough or city, and therefore a city
cannot, under the guise of" regulations,"
confer an exclusive privilege on a company for two years, requiring work to
be begun at a fixed time, and gas to be
introduced within fifteen months thereafter: Mfeadville Fuel Gas Co. v. Meadville Natural Gas Co., decided in the
Sup. Ct. Pa., May 31, z886.
Where a company had a rightful entrance into a city, but the latter refused
ft the right to cross three streets, whereby
great loss was sustained by the company
In loss of gas, an injunction was granted
to restrain the city's interference witi
crossing the streets, such a privilege
having been granted to a rival company:
People's Natural Gas Co. (885), i Pa.
C. C. 311.
An injunction to restrain a natural gas
company from using the streets of a
town, because of alleged insufficient
protection to the inhabitants in the use
of pipes, was refused; thereupon the
town passed an ordinance regulating the
matter, and asked leave to file a supplemental bill, setting up this ordinance.
The Court refused to allow the bill to
be filed: 4peal of Borough of.Butler,
decided in the Sup. Ct. of Pa., Nov. II,
x886.

UnreasonableRates.
A natural gas company, having the
power to exercise the right of eminent
domain, and to occupy the streets of a
city or town, must serve all alike, and
furnish gas at reasonable rates. This is
especially so under a statute declaring
that the transportation and supply of
such gas is of public benefit, and preventing the granting, by a town or city,
to any company, the exclusive privilege
to occupy the streets and supply gas.
Where a company, in a State where
such a statute was in force, after furnishing gas at a reasonable price, with assurance of continuance, secured a monopoly by terms made with competing
companies, demanded excessive rates
and threatened to shut off the gas unless
the increased rates were paid, a preliminary restraining order was granted upon
bill and affidavit, until the question could
be more thoroughly investigated: Waddinglon v. AlleghenyHeating Co. (1888),
6 Pa. C. C. 96; Sewickley Borintgh v.
Ohio Valley Gas Co. (1888), 6 Id. 99.
See Apleal of Scranton ElectricLight
and Heat Co. (1888), 122 Pa. 154.
[See Gas and Water Companies, 27
A.IrmR. LAW REG. 277.

Oil is a Mineral
The Act of Pennsylvania (April 25,
185o, P. L. 573) relating to accounts
between tenants in common of coal or
iron ore mines or minerals, includes oil
or petroleum, under the general term of
"other minerals "; and the fact that oil
was not known when the Act was
passed (1850), does not alter the case:
Thom1pson v. Noble (1870), 3 Pitts.
(Pa.) 201. A "mineral, and being a
mineral, is part of the realty :" Sloughton's Appeal (1879), 88 Pa. 198. But
a reservation of "all minerals," in a
deed,does not include petroleum: Dunham v. Kirpgatrick (1882), io Pa. 36.
Ownershtp of Oil.
Severance of oil from the freehold
does not divest the owner of the title,
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nor his right to the immediate possession, nor his replevying it, nor recovering
its value if he sees fit. Oil in a well
sunk by the owner of land is his exclusive property, whether drawn from an
underground current of oil, or found
standing. The case is not analogous to
the surface owner's right in running
streams of water. Such oil taken out of
the well by a wrong-doer, remains the
property of the well-owner: Hlail v.
Reed (1854), 15 B. Mon. (Ky.) 479.
Leases.
"Oil" is not synonymous with "gas":
therefore a lease of land to be occupied
and worked for petroleum, rock or carbon oil, and not for any other purpose
whatsoever; conditioned that if no oil
be found in paying quantities within
four years, the lease to be null and void,
is not satisfied by the finding of gas:
7'rub), v. Palmer,decided in the Sup,
Ct. of Pa., October 4, 1886.
Oil land, described by metes and
bounds, with a "protection" of eight
rods on the north side and ten rods on
the east side, was leased to E. It was
claimed that the north and east lines of
the protection were not to be extended
respectively beyond the east line and
north lines of the leased property; and
consequently the tract in the northeast
corner, eight by ten rods, could be leased
by the owner to T. for the purposes of
sinking an oil well. The Court held
that it could not; that the tract of eight
byten rods was within the "protection;"
and having leased this tract, T., who
sank a well, and thereby injured A.'s
well on the leased premises, was liable
to E. for damages, and would be enjoined in the same action: Allison &Ezvans' Apepal (1875 ),77 Pa.221.
B. leased to L. a tract of land, L. to
have the sole right to bore for oil for
twenty years, L. to commence operations in sixty days and to continue with
due diligence; if L. ceased operations

twenty days at any one time, B. could
resume possession. It was stipulated
that L.'s failure to comply with any one
of the conditions, should work a forfeiture, and B. might enter and dispose of
the premises as if the lease had not been
made. It was also stipulated that if L.
did not commence work at the time
specified, he should pay B. $3o a month
until L. should commence. Held, that
the covenant of forfeiture was modified,
not abrogated, by the clause for payment of rent; and L., having failed to
to commence work for four months and
then paying rent, was not entitled, at
the end of eleven months from the date
of payment, to tender the rent due and
insist upon a continuation of the lease:
Brown v. Vandergrift (1875), 8o Pa.
142.

A grant of certain land, in consideration of money paid, for the privilege
of going upon it to prospect and bore
for oil, with the exclusive use of one
acre around each well, and with free
ingress and egress in common with the
grantor, the latter to have one-third of
all "that is taken out" and the. right
of tillage of the land not occupied in
operating the wells, does not amount to
a lease nor sale of the land or oil, no
estate in soil or oil being granted. The
right of the grantee is to experiment for
oil, sever it from the soil and take it, on
yielding one third to the grantor, The
right of the grantee is a mere license to
work the land for oil, coupled with an
interest, not revocable at the pleasure of
the grantor or licensor: Funk v. Haldenan (I867), 53 Pa. 229.
A lease of land for oil required operations to be commenced within sixty
days from the date of lease, one well to
be completed within three months after
such operations are begun; and, in case
of a failure to complete one well within
that time, the lessee was to pay the
lessor for such delay $iooo per annum,
within three months after the time of
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completing such well. It was also
covenanted that a failure to complete
one well, or make such payment within
that time, "renders this lease null and
void, and to remain without effect between the parties thereto." The lessee
-did nothing towards drilling a well,
nor did he make any payment within
three months after a well should have
been completed. It was held that a
forfeiture of the lease did not happen
until default was made, both in completing the well and in paying for the
delay, or failure to complete it. But
the lessee having neither drilled the
first well nor paid the price of delay,
the lessor was entitled to recover at the
:stipulated rate, for the time the lessee
held exclusive right to operate: Galey
Kv.
Zeller7nan (1889), 123 Pa. 491.
An assignee of an oil-and-gas-lease
is not liable to the lessor, upon a covenant of the lease to drill a well upon
-the demised premises, when the time
for performance had elapsed before the
assignee acquired title under the assignment: Washing'lon Natural Gas Co.
v.Johnson (1889), 123 Pa. 576.
B. leased A's farm for the purpose of
exploring for oil, at a royalty of oneeighth of the production. He covenanted "To continue, with due diligence and without delay, to prosecute
the business to success or abandonment;
and if successful, to prosecute the same
without interruption, for the common
benefit of the parties." He assigned
an interest in the lease to C. and D.,
and they with B. assigned to E. Two
wells were bored, both of which were
producing wells. E. refused to bore
any other wells. A. sued E. upon the
covenant quoted. It was held that this
covenant was not the personal covenant
of B., but a covenant running with the
land, and binding on E.: and that the
measure of damages was the amount of
the oil A. ought to have received above
-the actual receipt, and the value of it
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during the times when it should have
been delivered to him; deducting therefrom the cost of producing, what ought
to have been produced at the time,
under the circumstances, and with the
appliances then known; and adding to
this remainder the interest on it from
the time when the oil ought to have
been produced to the time of the trial:
Bradford Oil Co. v. Blair (1886), 113
Pa. 83.
A lessee under an oillease, may not
conduct the naturalgasaway from the
land and appropriate it to his own use:
M.chen v. Smith (1882), 1x Pa. 452;
contra, Wood County Petroleum Co. v.
W Va. TransportalionCo. (1886), 28
W. Va. 210.

A grant of land "for the purpose of
prospecting, boring, digging, drilling,
pumping and otherwise searching for
and obtaining oil, salt and other minerals thereon," reserving to the grantor
one-fourth of all the oil produced, does
not convey a fee, but only a right to
work the land for oil, salt and other
minerals; and the sub-grantees are
bound by any conditions as to the control of the majority, that they may impose: Thompson's Appeal (1882), ioi
Pa. 225.
But a lessee who has the possession
of the land under an oil lease, has more
than a mere license, and can recoup or
recover taxes from the lessee under the
Pennsylvania Act of April 3, 1804:
.Kitchenv. Smith (1882), 101 Pa. 452.
A lease was granted by the owner of
land for the purpose of boring salt-wells
and manufacturing salt, so long as the
salt-well contemplated in the lease,
should be carried on by the lessee or
his assigns, under certain provisions for
a forfeiture, for a rent of every twelfth
barrel of salt manufactured. After a
time, oil rose with the salt-water, which,
though first allowed to run to waste,
was collected and sold. The owner
of the land claimed the oil, and brought
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trover for it. It was held that trover
search for oil, the lessor was entitled towould not lie, although the oil was his,
declare the forfeiture of the contract by
suit, and claim possession of the lands
for he had not the right of possession
at the time of conversion by the lessee,
without a formal putting in default.
The Court declined to decide whether
either of the oil itself or of the land
sulphur was a " similar product," under
from which it flowed; but the proper
remedy was a bill in equity for an
a contract based particularly upon the
account, the measure of damage being
expectation of finding petroleum: Bscoubos v. Loruisiana Petroleum and
the value of the oil at the instant of
separation from the freehold. It was
Coal Oil Co. (I870), 22 La. An. 28o.
shown that the lessee could not raise
A lease, purporting to be a grant or
the salt-water without raising the oil
license to take oil, drawn by an ignowith it: Xier v. Peterson (1862), 41 rant scrivener, at a time when the
Pa. 357nature or value of the mineral was not
A reservation, "expressly reserving
known, should be construed with referone-eighth of the oil produced from the
ence to the subject-matter, and the
land, to be divided between" the lessor
knowledge of such subject-matter at
the time; and as to its inartificial use
and lessee "on the land," means oneeighth of the oil raised to itesurface of technical language, the whole scope
by the grantee, and that the grantor is of the paper is to be considered: Frenchv. Brewer (i8i), U. S. Circ. Ct., W.
entitled to his share without deduction
for the expense in producing it: Union Dist., Pa., 3 Wall. Jr. 346.
Oil Company'sAApeal (1883), 3 Penny.
A lease, dated May 19, 1881, gave(Pa.) 504.
"the right to take, bore and mine for
An agreement to lease land for a
and gather all oil or gases found in
term of years, with the exclusive right and upon the premises, to have and to
to bore for and collect oil, giving onehold the same for the term of twelve'
fourth to the lessor, passes a corporeal years from this date, or as long as oil is
interest; and the lessee's taking of his found in paying quantities," the lessor
share of the 'oil found is not waste, but to receive one-eighth of the oil produced
a rightful act, unless the lease be for- and saved from the premises. The
feited by its own terms: Chicago, etc., lessee covenanted "to commence opeOil and Alining Co. v. U.S. Petroleum rations for said mining purposes, and
Co. (i868) 57 Pa. 83.
prosecute the same on some portion of'
An agreement was made, giving a the above described premises within
license to mine on land for oil, and a two years from this date, or thereafter
pay to the lessor [blank] dollars per
lease for ten years in case of a successful discovery. The lessor lost all rights
(blank] until work is commenced.
thereunder by lapse of time, not hav- This lease shall be null and void, and.
at an end, unless the lessee shall, within
ing discovered oil within the time limited by the contract. The lessor then
six months from this date, commence
agreed to refrain from declaring a forand prosecute, with due diligence, unfeiture, if the lessee would carry on the
avoidable accidents excepted, the sinksearch for petroleum constantly and with- ing and boring of one well on or in the
out cessation. It was held that the
vicinity of this lease, to a depth of 12olatter agreement was conditional; that
feet, unless oil in paying quantities is
sooner found. * * * If the lessee fail
its condition was suspen~ion; and that
when the lessee ceased to carry on to keep and perform the covenants and.
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agreements by him to be kept and performed, then this lease shall be null and
void, and surrendered to the lessor."
Within six months from the date of
the lease, the lessee drilled a well 1200
feet deep finding natural gas at a depth
of 1o45 feet in large quantities, and
some oil, but not in paying quantities,
at 1093 feeL The lessee used the gas
for fuel in drilling the well, but not in
any other manner. In the fall of 1882,
the lessee removed his engine, etc., leaving the casing in the well, and ceased
to carry on mining operations. In
February, 1884, the lessor released the
premises to T., who assigned such lease
to the defendant company, for the same
purpose, pursuant to which they entered into possession of the same and
collected and sold the gas.
The lessee in the first lease brought
an action to restrain'the lessee, and his
assignee, in the second lease, and their
common lessor from interfering with, or
appropriating to their own use, the gas
therein. It was held that there was no
covenant in the lease which required
the first lessee to continue the boring of
oil wells upon the premises until oil was
obtained in paying quantities, under a
penalty of forfeiting his rights by a failure so to do; that the covenant requiring
him to commence and prosecute operations for mining purposes within two
years from the date of the lease, or
thereafter pay to the lessor [blank] dollars per [blank] until work was commenced, was void for uncertainty, by
reason of the blanks which were left in
the vital and essential parts thereof;
that if a clause, that the lessor was to
have one-eighth of the gas, had been
omitted by mistake, the contract could
be re-formed and the clause inserted, so
as to express the intention of the parties;
that if it now expressed their intention,
they must abide by it; that the claim
(that the first lease had expired by reason of its own terms, as the provision
VOL. XXXVIII.-7

that the lessee should "have and hold
the same for the term of twelve years
from this date, or so long as oil is found
in paying quantities," limited the terms
to that period, during which oil was
found in paying quantities) was not well
founded, and that the term fixed was
for twelve years, and as much longer as
oil was found in paying quantities:
Eaton v. Wilcox (1886), 4 2 Hun (N. Y.)
6i.
A. leased land to B., with an oil well
partly bored thereon. B. agreed to sink
this well deeper, and to pay A. a royalty of one-fourth of all oil obtained
from it. Both parties supposed the well
was situated on the leased premises;
but it was afterwards discovered that
such was not the case. Then B. offered
to deliver possession of the premises
leased, and refused to pay the royalty.
It was held that a court of equity, on a
bill to account, would not order an account; the action should have been
brought at law. B. was not in a position to deny A.'s right to the royalty,
and if an accounting was allowed, it
would not be a bar to an action at law
fortheroyalty: .ifaysv.Dw,ht (1876),
82 Pa. 462.
B. leased of A. certain oil lands. No
rent was reserved, and no term of the
demise stated. B. agreed in the lease,
to put down a well to a depth of 6o&
feet, by a certain date; upon a failure
to do so, a right of entry was reserved to
the lessor. B. did not sink the well.
The lessor sued to recover for the breach.
It was held that if B. had dug the well,
it would have been his as well as the
product thereof; and that the lessor
could only recover nominal damages
for the breach, and not what it would
cost to sink such a well. The lease
was construed to be a perpetual one to
B., if he sank the well and kept the
covenants of the demise: Chamberlain
v. Parker(1871), 45 N.Y. 569.
A mining lease, for a term certain,

NATURAL GAS

CO. V. DE WITT el a4

saving only to the lessor the right of til- specified, entered upon the land and
lage, is exclusive, and the lessor cannot commenced to bore a well. The plaintiff sued the defendant, his assignees
mine himself within the tenement:
and B., to procure a judgment declaring
(Pa.)
Baker v. Dale (870), 3 Pitts
19o.
the S. lease forfeited and annulled, and
Land was leased exclusively for the to restrain the defendants from entering
purpose of producing oil, boring to be upon the land or boring therein for oil.
commenced within ten days, and con- The Court held that even though the
tinued with due diligence until success lease appeared upon its surface to have
or abandonment; and a failure to get become void by reason of the failure of
oil in paying quantities, or a cessure of the lessee to commence operations within
work for thirty days at any time, the time limited by it, and though the
amounted to a forfeiture of the lease. act of the defendant in thereafter enterIt was held that if the lessee failed to ing upon the land was a mere trespass,
get oil in one well, he had a right to yet as the controversy related to the
put down another, and as many more as sinking of oil wells in land, in violation
he pleased, so long as he worked with of rights therein claimed bythe plaintiff,
diligence to success or abandonment;
a court of equity would grant relief by
and that a cessation of work for thirty injunction; that as B. continued at all
days forfeited the lease: Munroe v.
times to occupy the land, it was not
-1ristrong(188o), 96 Pa. 307.
necessary that he should re-enter or
give any notice of htis intention to enIn October, 1875, B. agreed with S.
that the latter should, for a term of fif- force the forfeiture eccasioned by the
neglect of the lessees to'commence opteen years, have the right to enter upon
erations within the time limited; that
and use the lands of the former so far
as might be necessary to enable him to
even if any overt act or notice was rebore for oil, reserving to B. the one- quired, the execution and Ulelivery of the
eighth of all oil produced. Unless S.
new lease to M. was a sufficient declarshould commence boring the said well
ation of his election to enforce the forwithin nine months from the date of the
feiture; and that the defendant could
contract, it was "to become void and
not show that after the execution and
tease to be of anybindingeffect." This
delivery of the lease to Al., B. consented
contract was recorded and assigned to to his entering upon the land: .4llethe defendant, who entered upon the gheny Oil Co. v. Bradford Oil Co.
land and at once commenced to bore a
(i880), 21 Hun (N. Y.) 26; affirmed
well, in February, 1877. In Septem(188i), 86 N. Y. 638.
ber, 1876, B., who had remained in
A court will not decide, unaided by
possession of the land and in no way expert evidence, that natural gas is inwaived, extended or qualified the fulfill- cluded in a lease of the right to mine
ment of the contract, executed another
"for petroleum, rock or carbon oil, or
and similar lease to M. and others, conother valuable volatile substances :"
ferring upon them the exclusive right to Fordv. Buchanan (1886), i1 Pa. 31.
dig and bore for oil on the farm for the
The assignment of aleaseholdinterest,
term of twelve years, which lease was
including engines, boilers, tanks, tubing,
recorded in January, 1877. [The rederrick., and all other fixtures and perported decision says "1876," but this is
sonal property situated upon and apperevidently a clerical error.] M. and his taining thereto, does not transfer oil in
co-lessees assigned their lease to the
tanks at the well: Dresser v. Transplaintiff, who, within the time therein JortationCo. (1875), 8 W. Va,553.
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A. leased to 3. 22S acres for the sole
and only purt~o.e of mining and excavating for gas and oil, for twenty years,
or as long as oil or gas should be found
on the premises in paying quantities
within that period. The lessee agreed
to commence operations upon one well
within ninety days, and to prcsecute the
work" actively, diligently and continuously," and to complete the same on or
before a day named, "and upon failure
to do so within the time herein prescribed, to pay the party of the first part
the sum of Srooo annually, in advance,"
etc. It was declared that upon a failure
by the lessee to keep the covenants of
the lease, that "such failure to perform,
or breach of the said covenant, shall
work an absolute forfeiture of this grant
or lease, and the privileges or easements
hereby given shall absolutely cease, determine, and become null and void."
The Court held that the lessee could
not terminate the lease by breach of the
covenants, and the lessor might or might
not terminate it, on such breach, at his
pleasure: tTisv. Manufacturers'Natairal Gas Co., decided in the Supreme
Ct. of Pa., Nov. ii,f889.
Aleasure of Damage on a Contract to
Dig,an Oil or Gas Well.
A. contracted to sink an oil well
within twelve months, or pay $25 per
annum until work commenced. In an
action for this sum, it was held to be a
good defense, except as to nominal
damages, that the contract was founded
on a mutual mistake as to the existence
ofoil on the lands: Be//v.Trait(I872),
9 Bush (Ky.) 257.

If the contract is to dig a well a certain depth and of a certain width, digging one of the required depth, but of a
narrower width, is not a compliance with
the contract; and there can be no recovery, even if no gas is found, although
the one dug was as effectual in determining whether gas could there be found

as the wider one: Gillespie Tool Co. v.
Wilson (x888), 123 Pa. 19.
Grant of Excusive Use of Streets.
[Beyond compensation for the additional burden upon the land used as a
street (supra, page 105), the greater
question arises of the power to secure
the exclusive right to lay pipes.
As a result of many authorities upon
this subject, it may be stated that a
town or city, without power expressly
conferred upon it by statute, cannot
grant to a natural or artificial gas company, or one incorporated to furnish
water, the right to an exclusive use of
its streets, for the purpose of laying
pipes therein, and supplying the inhabitants with gas or water; and if it does
do so, it may, without danger of liability, disregard the grant and give other
and similar companies, such privileges.
If the town or city is empowered to
grant such exclusive use by statute, or
the legislature grant such an exclusive
privilege; and the privilege or use is
accepted by the company, and expenditures are made in pursuance thereof,
the grant becomes a contract, which
cannot be revoked, either by the city or
the legislature.
[These statements are sustained and
illustrated by the following cases:
Afunici2pal Grant.
[Such grants are void, because the
general rule of law denies to municipal
corporations, the power to create monopolies: ELLIOTT, J., Citizens G. &
NL Co. v. Town of B/lwood (1887), 114
Ind. 332, 336. I/l. & St. L. R. R. & C.
Co. v. City of St. Louis (1872), U. S.
Circ. Ct., E. Dist. Mo., 2 Dill. 70 (grain
elevated); Davenport v. Kleinschmidt
(1887), 6 Mont. 502, 529 (water supply).
["The exercise of such power may
be convenient, but that is not sufficient;
it must be essential and indispensable
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to the powers expressly granted, or to
the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation. * * * It is certainly not
essential, or necessarily incident to the
power, expressly granlted, ' to lay off
streets,' etc., ' and light the same,' that
the city should delegate to a private
individual, or corporation, the exclusive
right to furnish such light, and ue the
streets for that purpose. To justify such
a construction, it must appear that in no
other proper, or reasonable manner,
could the city provide light for its streets
and inhabitants :' SNYDER, J., Parkersburg Gas Co. v. City of Parkersburg
(1887), 30 W. Va. 435, 440.
[Where municipalities are authorized
to grant the privilege of using the
streets, no arbitrary authority is thereby
conferred, but their action must be by
an ordinance which is general in its
nature and impartial in its operation,
and which does not grant aspecial privilege to any company: ELLIOTT, J.
Citizens G. &I' Af Co. v. Town of ElWood(t887), ii4 Ind. 332, 338.
[In this case, a statute of Indiana
(approved March 7, 1887, Laws, p. 36)
provides-" SEcTION I. Be it, etc.,
That the Boards of Trustees of towns,
and the Common Councils of cities in
this State, shall have power to provide
by ordinance, reasonable regulations for
the safe supply, distribution and consumption of natural gas, within the respective limits of such towns and cities,
and to require persons or companies, to
whom the privilege of using the streets
and alleys of such towns and cities is
granted, for the supply and distribution
of such gas, to pay a reasonable license
for such franchise and privilege."
Alunicipal Revocation.
[If an exclusive grant is 'made, the
municipality may subsequently make
another grant to another company, with
impunity; the first grant being a contract beyond the power of the munici-
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pality: GrandRapids E. L. 6- P. Co.
v. GrandRapids E. E. L. & F. G.
Co. (1888), U. S. Circ. Ct., W. Dist
Mich., 33 Fed. Repr. 659, 667, 677.
Alunici)al Contracts.
[If the contract is not warranted by
the city charter, the city councils have,
at all times, the right to declare it void
and to refuse compliance with itBrenham v. Brenham Water Co.
(1887), 67 Texas 542, 553.
[Subject to legislative interference
(see below), a contract with a coal gas
company, properly entered into, will
bind the municipality, upon informal
renewal: Taylor v.Lavzertville (887),
43 N. J. Eq. 107, "before BIRD, V. C.
And may be modified by subsequent
contracts: City of St. Louis v. St. Louis
G.-L. Co. (1879), 70 Mo. 69; s. C., 5
Mo. App. 484.
[If a municipality refuses to take and
pay for coal gas, it would probably be
liable in damages: ADAs, C. J., Sarl'
v. Abraham (1887), 73 Iowa 507.
[Where a city charter gave authority
to the common council to provide, by
ordinance, "for a supply of water for
said city," and an ordinance was duly
passed for a contract, and the contract
contained a stipulation to pay an annual
sum for fire purposes, the city was bound
to pay for the water supply under the
terms of the contract. It was no defense
that the contract was to be continued as
long as the company performed its part,
because the authority to contract in this
manner could not be denied to the city,
under another section of its charter, requiring taxation for defraying the expense of water supply to be annual:
Atlantic City W W. Co. v. Atlantic City
(1886), 48 N. J. Law 378.
Additional Zight.
[There is a strong current of authorities to the effect that an exclusive contract for lighting the streets by coal gas,
is not infringed by granting permission
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to an electric light company to light the
streets, stores and houses: the question
is interesting as showing the limits upon
exclusive grants bymunicipalities. Upon
the abstract question of more light, these
authorities are not necessarily conclusive: ParkersburgGas Co. v. The City
of Parkersburg(I887), 30 V.Va. 435,
442; Saginaw G.-L. Co. v. The City of
Saginaw (1886), U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D.
Mich., 28 Fed. Repr. 529, 538.
Legislative Revocation.
[Where a municipality was authorized by statute, to contract with a coal
gas company, for the lighting of the
streets, and made a contract for five
years, this contract could be terminated
by the repeal of the statute within the
five years: Richmond Co. Gaslight Co.
v. Zkiddletown (1874), 59 N. Y. 228,
232. The same ruling was made in the
case of a ten year contract which the
municipality afterwards repudiated:
Garrison v. City of Chicago (1877),
U. S. Circ. Ct., N. Dist. Ill., 7 Biss. 480;
and a twenty-five year contract, on intervention of the State, by quo warranto : The State, ex rel. v. Cin. G. L.
.& C. Co. (1868), iS Ohio St. 262.
Legislative Grant.
[The legislature may confer upon a
private corporation, the exclusive right
to furnish coal gas to the citizens of a
municipality; and in such cases, the
legislative right to supervise and control, remains, unless clearly given up in
a constitutional manner: State v. OK/fil-zaukee G. L. Co. (1872), 29 Wis. 454,
460, 462 ; The State, ex rel. v. Colunbus G. L. & C. Co. (1878), 34 Ohio
St. 572; City of Mempfhis v. The
.ZklemPhis Water Co. (1871), 5 Heisk.
(Tenn.) 495, 530.
[Such privilege is a franchise which
.can only emanate, directly or indirectly, from the sovereign power of
the State: ScoTT, J. The State, ex
r'el. v. Cin. G. L. 6OC. Co. (1868),

iS Ohio St. 262, 291 ; Hamilton G.-L.
Co. v. The City of Hamilton (1889), U.
S. Circ. Ct., S. Dist. Ohio, 37 Fed.
Repr. 832, 837; Saginaw G.-L. Co. v.
CYity of Saginaw (1886), U. S. Circ. Ct.,
E. Dist. Mich., 28 Fed. Repr. 529,535,
536.
[This right was denied, as creating a
monopoly, in the early coal gas case of
Norwcich Gas Light Co. v. Norwich
City Gas Co. (1856), 25 Conn. 19.
But all doubt has since been removed
by subjecting such contracts to the police
power of the State, while upholding
their sanctity, when otherwise valid:
New OrleansWater Works Co. v. Rivers
(1885), 115 U. S. 674; Nrew Orleans
Gas-Light Co. v. La. Light & Heat P.
&' AL'.Co. (1885), Id. 650; Louisville
Gas Co. v. Citizens' G.-L. Co. (1885),
Id. 683; St. Tammany Water Works Co.
et al.v. New Orleans Water Works Co.
(1886), 120 U. S. 64; The Binghamnj5ton Bridge (1865), 3 Wall. (70 U. S.)
51, 8I.
Exclusive Right of Way.
[In the case of the West Virginia
Trans. Co. v. Ohio River Pipe Line
Co. (I883), 22 W. Va. 6oo, the grant
of an exclusive use of a tract of land,
for a pipe and telegraph line, was held
to be void, as contrary to public policy
and imposing an unreasonable restraint
upon trade, by preventing others from
transporting oil from or through theland.
Restrictingthe Transportationof Natural Gas.
Natural gas, when brought to the
surface, and placed in pipes for transportation, is an article of commerce,
and the legislature cannot enact a law
forbidding its transportation beyond the
limits of the State: Slate, ex rel. Corwin,
v. Indiana &- Ohio 0. G. &I Of. Co.,
decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana, November 6, 1889.
W. W. THORNTON.
Indianapolis, Ind.
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Supreme Court of the United States.
ILLINOIS C. R. R. CO. ET AL. v. BOSWORTH

ET AL.

The confiscation of a person's real estate, as enemy property, by proceedings ir
remt, under the Statute of July 17, 1862, puts the fee in abeyance-in nubibus;
but if the former owner be pardoned as a personal offender, the fee revests in him.
Proceedings in rent, against enemy property, are personal, and for the punishment of offenders guilty of treason and rebellion.

In error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Louisiana.
James Fentress, Thomas j. Semmes, and Girault Farrar,for
plaintiffs in error.
E. H Farrarand E. B. Kruttschnitt,for defendants in error.
BRADLEY, J., January 20, 1890. This was an action brought
by Millard Bosworth and Charles H. Bosworth, only surviving
children of A. W. Bosworth, deceased, to recover possession
of one undivided sixth part of a certain tract of land in New
Orleans, which formerly belonged to their said father.
The petition states that the latter having taken part in the
war of the Rebellion, and done acts which made him liable to
the penalties of the Confiscation Act of July 17, 1862, the said
one-sixth part of said land was seized, condemned, and sold
under said act, and purchased by one Burbank in May, 1865;
that the said A. W. Bosworth died on the i Ith day of October,
1885; and that the plaintiffs, upon his death, became the
owners in fee-simple of the said one.sixth part of said property,
of which the defendant, the Illinois Central Railroad Company,
was in possession.
The company filed an answer, setting up various defenses;
among other things, tracing title to themselves from the said
A. W. Bosworth, by virtue of an act of sale executed by him
and his wife, before a notary public, on the 23d day of September, 1871, disposing of all their interest in the premises,
with full covenant of warranty. They further allege that said
Bosworth had, before said act of sale, not only been included
in the general amnesty proclamation of the president, issued
on the 25th of December, I868, but had received a special
pardon on the 2d of October, 1865, and had taken the oath of
allegiance, and complied with all the terms and conditions
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necessary to be restored to, and reinvested with, all the rights,
franchises, and privileges of citizenship..
The parties, having waived a trial by jury, submitted to the
Court an agreed statement of facts in the nature of a special
verdict, upon which the Court gave judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs. To that judgment the present writ of error is
brought.
Those portions of the statement of facts which are deemed
material to the decision of the case are as follows, to-witist. The plaintiffs, Millard Bosworth and Charles H. Bosworth, are the only
surviving legitimate children of Abel Ware Bosworth, who died intestate in the city
of New Orleans on the iith day of October, 1885, and have accepted his succession with benefit of inventory.
2nd. By act before Edward Barnett, notary, on the 25th day of April, Is86o, Abel
Ware Bosworth purchased from H. W. Palfrey and others a one-third undivided
interest in fee-simple title and full ownership in and to the property described in
the petition of the plaintiffs in this cause.
3rd. On the breaking out of the war between the States, Abel W. Bosworth
entered the Confederate Army, and bore arms against the Government of the United
States from about March, x861, until April, 1865.
4th. Under and by virtue of the Confiscation Act of the United States, approved
July 17, 1862, and the joint resolution contemporary therewith, the said property
was seized by the proper officer of the United States, and on the 2oth day of January, 1865, a libel of information was filed against the said property as the property
of A. W. Bosworth, in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Into these proceedings intervened Mrs. Rachel Matilda Bosworth, wife of said Abel Ware Bosworth, to protect her communityinterests in said
property, and, after due proceedings had, the said Court entered a decree of condemnation as to A. W. Bosworth, and a decree in favor of Mrs. Rachel Matilda
Bosworth, recognizing her as the owner of one-half of said one-third undivided
interest in and to said property. A venditioni exponas, in due form of law, issued
to the marshal for the sale of said property under said decree, and at said sale "all
the right, title, and interest of A. W. Bosworth in and to the one undivided third
part of said property" (reserving to Mrs. Rachel M. Bosworth her rights therein,
as per order of the Court), was adjudicated on the day of the month of May,
1865, to E. W. Burbank, for the price and sum of $S,7oo,and the marshal executed
a deed in due form of law to said Burbank for the same.
6th. That on the 2nd day of October, 1865, Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States, granted to said A. W. Bosworth a special pardon, a duly certified
copy of which, together with the written acceptance by said Bosworth thereof, is
hereto annexed, made part of this statement of facts, and marked "Document A."
7th. That on the 23rd day of September, 1871, by act before Andrew Hero, Jr.,
notary public, the said A. XV. Bosworth and Mrs. Rachel Matilda Bosworth, his
wife, sold, assigned, and transferred to Samuel H. Edgar, with full warranty, under
the laws of Louisiana, all their right, title, and interest in and to the said property,
including the one-sixth undivided interest claimed in this suit by the plaintiffs and
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described in the petition, for the price and sum of eleven thousand six hundred and
sixty-six two-third dollars.
8th. That on the l8th day December, 1872, the said E. IV. Burbank, by act
before the same nntary, transferred all his iight, title, and interest, in the nature of
a quitclaim to S. H. Edgar aforesaid, for the price and sum of five thousand one
hundred dollars.
9th. That the said S. H. Edgar, by act executed before Charles Nettleton, a duly
authorized commissioner for Louisiana, in New York City, on the loth day of October, 1872, and duly recorded in the office of the Register of Conveyances for the
parish for Orleans, on the 3oth day of October, 1872, sold and transferred the same
property, with full warranty under the laws of Louisiana, unto the New Orleans,
Jackson & Great Northern Railroad Company.
loth. That by various transfers made since said date, as set forth in the answers
filed
in this suit, the said property has come into the possession of the Chicago, St.
Louis & New Orleans Railroad Company, who has leased the same to the Illinois
Central Railroad Company, which said company holds said property under said
lease.
14th. It is further agreed, as a part of this statement of facts, that the President
of the United States, on the 25th day of December, i868, issued a general amnesty
proclamation, and the terms of said proclamation, as found in the Statutes at Large
of the United States, are made part of this statement of facts.

The following is a copy of the special pardon (Document A)
referred to in the statement of facts, and of the written acceptance thereof, to-wit-Andrew Johnson, President of the United States of America, to all to whom
these presents shall come, greeting:
"Whereas, A. NV Bosworth, of New Orleans, Louisiana, by taking part in the
late Rebellion against the Government of the United States, has made himself
liable to heavy pains and penalties; and, whereas, the 'circumstances of his case
render him a proper object of executive clemency:
"Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnson, President of the United
States of America, in consideration of the premises, divers other good and sufficient
reasons to me thereunto moving, do hereby grant to the said A. W. Bosworth a full
pardon and amnesty for all offenses by him committed, arising from participation,
direct or implied, in the said Rebellion, conditioned as follows:
"1st. This pardon to be of no effect until the said A. W. Bosworth shall take
the oath prescribed in the proclamation of the President, dated May 29 th, 1865.
"12d. To be void and of no effect, if the said A. . Bosworth shall hereafter at
any time acquire any property whatever in slaves, or make use of slave labor.
"3rd. That the said A. IV. Bosworth first pay all costs which may have accrued
in any proceedings instituted or pending against his person or property before the
date of the acceptance of this warrant.
" 4th. That the said A. W. Bosworth shall not, by virtue of this warrant, claim
any property, or the proceeds of any property, that has been sold by the order, judgment, or decree of a court under the confiscation laws of the United States.
"5th. That the said A. NV. Bosworth shall notify the Secretary of State, in writing, that he has received and accepted the foregoing pardon.
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" "In testimony whereof, I have hereunto signed my name, and caused the seal of
-the United States to be affixed. Done at the City of Washington this second day
-of October, A. D. 1865, and of the independence of the United States the ninetieth.
' ANDREW JOHNSON.

" By the President:
[Seal.]

WILLIAm H. SEVARD,
Secretary of State."
"Washington,

D. C., October 5th, 1865.

Honorable William H. Seward, Secretary of State.
"Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the President's warrant
-of pardon, bearing date October 2nd, 1865, and hereby signify my acceptance of
the same, with all the conditions therein specified. I am, sir, your obedient servant,
"A. NV. BoswoRTH."

The proclamation of general amnesty and pardon, issued on
the 25 th day of December, 1868, referred to in the last article
of the statement of facts, is found in volume 15, pp. 711, 712,
Statutes at Large. After referring to several previous proclamations, it proceeds as follows, to-wit"9And whereas, the authority of the Federal Government having been re-established in all the States and Territories within the jurisdiction of the United States,
it is believed that such prudential reservations and exceptions, as at the dates of
;said several proclamations were deemed necessary and proper, may now be wisely
and justly relinquished, and that a universal amnesty and pardon for participation
in said Rebellion extended to all who have borne anypart therein, will tend to
secure permanent peace, order, and prosperity throughout the land, and to renew
and fullyrestore confidence and fraternal feeling among the whole people, and their
respect for and attachment to the National Government, designed by its patriotic
.
founders for the general good.
"Now, therefore, be it known that I, Andrew Johnon, President of the United
States, by virtue of the power and authority in me vested by the Constitution, and
in the name -of the sovereign people of the United States, do hereby proclaim and
declare unconditionally, and without reservation, to all and to every person who,
directly or indirectly, participated in the late insurrection or Rebellion, a full pardon
and amnesty for the offense of treason against the United States, or of adhering to
their enemies during the late civil war, with restoration of all rights, privileges,
and immunities under the Constitution and the laws which have been made in
pursuance thereof."

The principal question raised in the present case, is whether,
by the effect of the pardon and amnesty granted to A. W.
Bosworth by the special pardon of October, 1865, and the
general proclamation of amnesty and pardon of December 25,
1868, he was restored to the control and power of disposition
over the fee-simple, or naked property in reversion expectant
upon the termination of the confiscated estate in the-property
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in dispute. The question of the effect of pardon and amnesty
on the destination of the remaining estate of the offender, still
outstanding after a confiscation of the property during his
natural life, has never been settled by this Court. That the
guilty party had no control over it, in the absence of such
pardon or amnesty, has been frequently decided: Wallach v.
Van Riswick (1875), 92 U. S. 202 ; Chaffraix v. Shiff (1875),
Id. 214; Pike v. Wassell (I876), 94 Id. 711; French v. Wade
(1880), 102 Id. 132; and see Avegon v. Schmidt (1885), 113
Id. 293; Shields v. Schiff (1.888), 124 Id. 351. But it has
been regarded as a doubtful question what became of the fee,
or ultimate estate, after the confiscation for life.
",
We are not, therefore, called upon," said Justice STRONG, in Wallach v. Van
Riswick, "to determine where the fee dwells during the continuance of the interest of a purchaser at a confiscation sale, whether in the United States, or in the
purchaser, subject to be defeated by the death of the ofiender :" 92 U. S. 2I2.

It has also been suggested that the fee remained in the person whose estate was confiscated, but without any power in
him to dispose of or control it.
Perhaps it is not of much consequence which of these theories, ,if
either of them, is the true one; the important point being that the remnant of the estate, whatever its nature, and
wherever it went, was never beneficially disposed of, but remained (so to speak) in a state of suspended animation. Both
the common and the civil laws furnish analogies of suspended
ownership of estates which may help us to a proper conception
of that now under consideration. Blackstone says"Sometimes the fee may be in abeyance, that is (as the word signifies) in expectation, remembrance, and contemplation in law, there being no person in esse in
whom it can vest and abide, though the law considers it as always potentially existing, and ready to vest whenever a proper owner appears. Thus, in a grant to
John for life, and afterwards to the heirs of Richard, the inheritance is plainly
neither granted to John nor Richard, nor can it vest in the heirs of Richard till
his death, narn neno est hares viventir; it remains, therefore, in waiting or abeyance during the life of Richard :"

2 Bl. Comm. 107.

In the civil law, the legal conception is a little different.
Pothier says"1The dominion of property (or ownership), the same as all other rights, as well
in re as ad rem, necessarily supposes a person in whom the right subsists, and to
whom it belongs. It need not be a natural person; it may belong to corporations

ILLINOIS C. R. R. CO. V. BOSWORTH.

or communities, which have only a civil and intellectual existence or personality.
When an owner dies, and no one will accept the succession, this dormant succession (successione jacente) is considered as being a civil person, and as the continuation of that of the deceased; and in this fictitious person subsists the dominion or ownership of whatever belonged to the deceased, the same as all other
active and passive rights of the deceased; hcereditasjacenspersonedeftncti locumloblinet:" Droit de Domaine de ProprietY, cc. I, 15.

But, as already intimated, it is not necessary to be over
curious about the intermediate state in which the disembodied
shade of naked ownership may have wandered during the
period of its ambiguous existence. It is enough to know that
it was neither annihilated, nor confiscated, nor appropriated to
any third party. The owner, as a punishment for his offenses,
was disabled from exercising any acts of ownership over it,
and no power to exercise such acts was given to any other
person. At his death, if not before, the period of suspension
comes to an end, and the estate revives and devolves to his
heirs at law.
In Avegno v. Schmidt (1885), 113 U. S. 293, and in Shields
v. Schiff (I888), 124 Id. 351, this Court held that the heirs
of the offender, at his death, take by descent from him, and
not by gift or grant from the government. They are not
named in the confiscation act, it is true, nor in the joint resolution limiting its operation. The latter merely says"Nor shall any punishment or proceedings under said act, be so construed as to
work a forfeiture of the real estate of the offender, beyond his natural life."

The Court has construed the effect of this language to be,
to leave the property free to descend to the heirs of the guilty
party: Bigelow v. Forrest(1870), 9 Wall. (76 U.S.) 339; Wallach
v. Van Riswick (1875), 92 U. S. 202, 210. Mr. Justice STRONG
in the latter case, speaking of the constitutional provision that
no attainder of treason should work corruption of blood or
forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted (which
provision was the ground and cause for passing the joint resolution referred to), said"No one ever doubted that it was a provision introduced for the benefit of the
children and heirs alone,-a declaratioa that the children should not bear the
iniquity of the fathers."

But although the effect of the law was to hold the estate, or
naked ownership, in a state of suspension for the benefit of the
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heirs, yet they acquired no vested interest in'it; for, until the
death of the ancestor, there is no heir. During his life it does
not appear who the heirs will be. Heirs apparent have, in a
special case, been received to intervene for the protection of
the property from spoliation: Pike v. Wassell (I88O), 94 U.
S. 711. This was allowed from the necessity of the case, arising from the fact that the ancestor's disability prevented him
from exercising any power over the property for its protection
or otherwise, and no other persons but the hei'rs apparent had
even a contingent interest to be protected.
, It would seem to follow, as a logical consequence from the
decision in Avegno v. Schmidt and Shields v. Schiff,that after
the confiscation of the property, the naked fee (or the naked
ownership, as denominated in the civil law), subject, for the
life-time of "the offender, to the interest or usufruct of the purchaser at the confiscation sale, remained in the offender himself; otherwise, how could his heirs take it from him by inheritance? But by reason of his disability to dispose of'or
touch it, or affect it in any manner whatsoever, it remained as
before stated, a-mere dead estate, or in a condition of suspended animation. We think that this is, on the whole, the
most reasonable view.. There is no corruption of blood. The
offender can transmit by descent; his heirs take from him by
descent. Why, then, is it not most rational to conclude that
the dormant and suspended fee has continued in him?
Now, if the disabilities which prevented such person from
exercising any power over this suspended fee, or naked property, be removed by a pardon or amnesty,-so removed as to
restore him to all his rights, privileges, and immunities, as if
he had never offended, except as to those things which have
become vested in other persons,-why does it not restore him
to the control of his property so far as the same has never
been forfeited, or has never become vested in another person?
In our judgment, it does restore him-to such control. In the
opinion of the Court in the case of Exparte Garland(1867),
4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 333, 380, the effect of a pardon is stated as
follows, to wit"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense, and the guilt
of the offender; and, when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots
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out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of'the'laiw, the offender is as innocent
as if he had never committed the offense. If granted iefore conviction, it prevents
any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching;
if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores
him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a
new credit and capacity. There is only this limitition to its operation,-it does
not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in others in consequence
of the conviction and judgment."

The qualification in the last sentence of this extract, that a
pardon does not affect vested interests, was exemplified in the
case of Semmes v. U. S. (1875), 91 U. S. 21, where a pardon
was held not to interfere with the right of a purchaser of -the
forfeited estate. The same doctrine had been laid down in the
Confiscation Cases (1874), 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 92, II 2, 113. It
was distinctly repeated and explained in Knote v. U S. (1877);
95 U. S. 149. In that case, property of the claimant had been
seized by the authorities of the United States, on the ground
of treason and rebellion; a decree of condemnation and forfeiture had been passed, the property sold, and the proceeds paid
into the Treasury. The Court decided that subsequent pardon
and amnesty did not have the effect of restoring to the offender
the right to these proceeds. They had become absolutely
vested in the United States, and could not be devested by the
pardon. The effect of a pardon was so fully discussed in that
case, that an extract from the opinion of the Court will not be
out of place here. The Court say"A pardon is an act of grac, by which an offender is released from the consequences of his offense, so far as such release is practicable and within 6ontiol of
the pardoning power, or of officers under its direction. It releases the offender
from all disabilities imposed by the offense, and restores to him all his civil rights.
In contemplation of law, it so far blots out the offense that afterwards it cannot le
imputed to him, to prevent the assertion of his legal rights. It gives to him a
new credit and capacity, and rehabilitaties him to that extent in his former position. But it does not make amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has
been suffered by the offender, in his person by imprisonment, forced labor, or
otherwise. It does not give compensation for what has been done or suffered, nor
does it impose upon the Government any obligation to give it. The offense being
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered while
they were in force, is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered,
and no satisfaction for it can be required. Neither does the pardon affect any
rights which have vested in others directly by the execution of the judgment for
the offense, or which have been acquired by others while that judgment was in
force. If, for example, by the judgment, a sale of the offender's property has
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been had, the purchaser will hold the property notwithstanding the subsequent
pardon. And if the proceeds of the sale have been paid to a party to whom the,
law has assigned them, they cannot be subsequently reached and recovered by the
offender. * * * So, also, if the proceeds have been paid into thetreasury, the
right to themhas so far become vested in the United States that theycan onlybe se"cured to the former owner of the property through an act of Congress. * * *
Where, however, property condemned, or its proceeds, have not thus vested, but
remain under control of the executive, or of officers subject to his orders, or are
in the custody of the judicial tribunals, the property will be restored or its proceeds delivered to the original owner, upon his full pardon."

The last portion of the above extract was justified by the
decision in the case of Armstrong's Foundry (I868), 6 Wall.
(73 U. S.) 766, where a pardon was received by Armstrong, after his foundry had been seized, and while proceedings were
pending .for its confiscation. He was even allowed to plead
the full pardon as new matter in this Court, while the case was
pending an appeal; and the Court held, and decided, that this
pardon relieved him of so much of the penalty as accrued to
the United States, without any expression of opinion as to the
rights of the informer.
The citations now made, are sufficient to show the true bearing and effect of the pardon granted to Bosworth, and of the
general proclamation of amnesty as applied to him. The property in question had never vested in any person, when these
acts of grace were performed. It had not even been forfeited.
Nothing but the life-interest had been forfeited. His power to
enjoy or dispose of it, was simply suspended by his disability
as an offender against the Government of the United States.
This disability was a part of his punishment. It seems to be
perfectly clear, therefore, in the light of the authorities referred
to, that when his guilt and the punishment therefor were expunged by his pardon this disability was removed. In being
restored to all his rights, privileges, and immunities, he was restored to the control of so much of his property and estate as had
not become vested either in the Government or in any other
person; especially that part or quality of his estate which had
never been forfeited, namely, the naked residuary ownership
of the property, subject to the usufruct of the purchaser under
the confiscation proceedings.
This result, however, does not depend upon the hypothesis
that the dead fee remained in Bosworth after the confiscation
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proceedings took place. It is equally attained if we suppose
that the fee was in nubibus, or that it devolved to the Government for the benefit of whom it might concern. We are not
trammeled by any technical rule of the common or the civil law
on the subject. The statute, and the inferences derivable therefrom, make the law that controls it. Regarding the substance
of things, and not their form, the truth is simply this: A portion of the estate, limited in time, was forfeited. The residue,
expectant upon the expiration of that time, remained untouched,-undisposed of; out of the owner's power and control, it is true, but not subject to any other person's power or
c:ontrol. It was somewhere, or possibly nowhere. But if it had
not an actual, it had a potential existence, ready to devolve to the
heirs of the owner upon his death, or to be revived by any
other cause that should call it into renewed vitality or enjoyment. The removal of the guilty party's disabilities, restoration of all his rights, powers and privileges, not absolutely
lost or vested in another, was such a cause. Those disabilities
were all that stood in the way of his control and disposition
of the naked ownership of the property. Being removed, it
necessarily follows that he was restored to that control and
power of disposition.
It follows, from these views, that the act of sale executed
by A. W. Bosworth and his wife in September, 1871, was effectual to transfer and convey the property in dispute, and
that the judgment of the Circuit Coiart in favor of the
plaintiffs below (the defendants in error) was erroneous. That
judgment is therefore reversed and the cause remanded, with
instructions to enter judgment for the defendants below, the
now plaintiffs in error.
BLATCHFORD, J., did not sit in this case, or take any part in
its decision.
The statement of facts in the opinion
shows that the proceedings against A.
W. Bosworth's propeity were civil proceedings, in ren, against it as enemy
property under the Act of July 17, 1862
(12 Stat. at Large 589). The opinion,
'however, treats them as criminal proceedings, inptersonam, against Bosworth

himself (father of the defendants in
error), for the crime of treason or rebellion; repeatedly speaks of him as an
"offender," and of the civil confiscation
as a "punishment;" and it concludes
that the personal pardon of the condemned offender operates the restoration
to him of the fee simple of his real
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estate from whatever effect the actio in
rem had had upon it.
In JRigelow v. Forrest(1870), 9 Wall.
(76 U. S.) 339, proceedings in rem,
under the act, were first treated as in
Jpersonam; the civil action against enemy
property, as a criminal one to punish for
treason; and it was held that the children of French Forrest could recover
after his death, because "the punishment
inflicted upon him, is not to descend to
his children ;" because "the forfeiture
of the land of the offender was * * *
without any corruption oJf his heritable
blood," etc.
AIc Veigh. v. United States (187), I1
Wall. (78 U. S.) 25,9, is the next important case, growing out of a confiscation
proceeding in rem, in which the Supreme
Court took a similar view of the condemnation of enemy property under the
act; They treated the proceedings as
though they had been a personal criminal trial of McVeigh himself, and discussed his "criminality," "guilt," "offenses," etc., though he had not been
indicted, arrested, or tried in that civil
case against his property as enemy property, which the act authorized.
In Ofiller v. Unlited States (871), I
Wall. (78 U. S.) 292, the Supreme Court
took the opposite view of proceedings
under the act. They held that, though
the first four sections of the statute related to personal criminal proceedings
for treason, the second four, underwhich
the confiscation was decreed, were confined to civil proceedings in rein, against
enemy property only, under the law of
nations. The res was personal property,
in the proceedings which the Court was
reviewing; but in the closely following
case of Tyler v. Defrees (871), II
Wall. (78 U. S.) 331, which was concerning land as the res, the Court took
the same view, and said of the Confiscation Act of 1862, which it was expounding, that it was "designed to in,
troduce the principle of confiscating

enemy property,. seized on land, like
that seized on water." And further:
The Constitution imposes" no restriction
upon the power to prosecute war, or
confiscate enemy's property." Mr. Justice FIELD (with whom CLIFFORD and
DAvis, JJ., then concurred, though the
last assented to the judgment in the
Tyler case) dissented in both these cases,
and contended that the proceeding was.
personal, criminal and unconstitutional,
because it was not preceded by indictment and arrest. The majority of the
court, basing the proceedings on the
confiscation sections of the act only, left
the joint resolution, explanatory, out of'
consideration, since that was expressly
confined to "forfeiture" as a "punishment" of the "offender," confining it to.
his "natural life" in nearly the same
terms used in the Constitution relative
to personal trials for the crime of treason.
Brown v. .Eennedy (I873), 15 Wall(82 U. S.) 591, is substantially in accord.
with the two foregoing decisions, and
there was no dissent," except that of
FIELD, J.

In the next case, Day v. Micol (1874),.
IS Wall. (85 U. S.) i6o, which involved
the confiscation case of U S. v. TwoSguares of Ground [in the U. S. District Court at New Orleans, where certain land of Judah P. Benjamin was.
condemned], the Court discussed the
question, "What was the res 1" in
that proceeding, and held that the
fee of the land had not been condemned, and allowed a mortgagee, who
had been defaulted for non-appearance
in that proceeding, to foreclose after
condemnation. The answer of the Court
to its own question, deduced from the
decision, was that the land, minus the
lien upon it, was the res.
The next cases, U S. v. Slidell'sLand,
and U. S. v. Conrad's Lots, called by
the reporter, "The Confscation Cases"
(1874), 20 WVall. (87 U. S:) 92-117,
were against the theory that the pro,
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ceedings under the act wvere "personal
and criminal. The Court held, in these,
that "the liability of property" was the
only subject of inquiry; that "no judgment was possible against any person ;"
that "the enactment of Congress was
that the properly belonging to any one
embraced within several classes of persons, should be subject to seizure and
condemnation ;" that! persons were referred to only' to identify the proerty;"
that "reference to ownership was the
mode selected for designating that which
was made liable to confiscation;" that
"everything necessary to a common law
[sic] proceeding in rem, is found in the
record ;" that it was not necessary "to
conclude against the statute" because
that form is "inapplicable to civil proceedings."
There was nothing in these decisions
in accord with Ill. Cent. R. R. Co. v.
Bosworth-nothing favoring the doctrine that the proceedings in rem were in
personam, and nothing in common with
.Day v. Aficou (1874), iS Wall. (85
U. S.) 16o, except the dictum that
intervention should not have been allowed, the Supreme Court overlooking,
for the moment, that just such interventions were expressly authorized by
statute. (U. S. Rev. Stat., 5322; Act
of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 762.)
As to the question of the fee, the
Court said that by the decree of confiscation, "the United States succeeded to
the position of Slidell, whatever that
was;" that is, if he had held the fee
before the confiscation (which he had),
the United States held it afterwards.
And in the very next confiscation case,
Semmes. v. United States (1875), 91 U.
S. 21, the Court said: "Properties condemned as forfeited to the United States,
under the aforesaid Act of Congress
[that of July 17, 1862, under which all
the cases were brought, as well as the
one under review], become the property
of the United States from the date of the
VOL. XXXVIII.- 9

decree of condemnation: 12 Stat. 591,
Sec. 7- Judgment of forfeiture was
rendered in this case on the 5th of
April, 1865, and the land in question
became, from that date, the property of
the United States ; * *.* the title to the
landwas lost to him [Semmes] when it
became vesled i the Unted States.' *
Beyond doubt, the original decree of the
District Cohrt was complete anl correct.
- * * Such proceedings, under the Confiscation Act in question, are justified as
an exercise of belligerent rights against
a public enemy, and are not, in their
nature,a punishmentfortreason. Consequently, confiscation being a proceeding distinct from, and independent of,
the treasonable guilt of the owner of the
confiscated property, pardon-fortreasotz
will not restore rights to _0roperty previously condemned and sold in the exercise of belligerent rights, as against a
purchaser in good faith and for value."
The Supreme Court were unanimous in
this decision, and these quoted utterances, and the cases of Hiller v. U. S.
and The Confiscation Cases, supra,were
cited and relied upon. Respecting intervention, they said the intervener
"would have been remediless had he
not reconvened."
But Osbonz v. United States (1875),
91 U. S.474, on the subject of pardon,
antagonizes the case of .Senines, though
both are in the same volume. Admitting that "the confiscation law of 1862
is construed to apply only to public
enemies," the Court said, in close proximity (though not in close logical connection), that Osborn's pardon covered
"the offenses for which the forfeiture of
his property was decreed." (P. 477.)
* * * "The pardon of that offense
necessarily carried with it the release of
the penally attached to its commission.
It is of the very essence of a pardon that
it releases the offender ,um the consequence of his offense." And there are
other like expressions. (Opinion by
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J.) How could one be constitutionally convicted and punished without information or indictment, personal
arrest, trial by jury, etc., as he had contended could not be done, when dissenting in the Miller and 7,ler cases,
.nuAra ?
Next comes Wallach v. Van Riswick
(1875), 92 U. S. 202, in which it was
held that all the "estate and property"
of Wallach was condemned as "enemy
property," nothing was left in him. "It
is incredible that Congress, while providing for the confiscation of an enemy's
land,intended to leave in that enemy
a vested interest therein, etc. TLe description [in the act] of property thus
made liable to seizure, is as broad as
possible. It covers the estate of the
owner, all his estate or ownership. No
authority is given to seize less than the
-whole." And the Court quote from the
act, that the property seized "shall be
condemned as enemies' property and
become the property of the United
States," adding: "Nothing can be
plainer than that condemnation andsale
of the identical property seized, was intended by Congress, and it was expressly
declared that the seizure ordered should
be of all the estate and property of the
persons designated in the act."
This case was much like the one
-under review. Van Riswick had ac.quired the title of Wallach, as well as
that of the United States-just as the
plaintiffs in error, in the present case,
have done. But the Court held that
Wallach had nothing to convey, and
that his "heirs" could take (by inheritance?) after his death, notwithstanding
his deed to Van Riswick. For, though
holding, 'on the one hand, that the confiscation proceedings were civil, in rem,
against enemypr.operty, not any person,
the Court held, on the other, that the
Joint Resolution Explanatory was applicable to the proceedings as criminal, in
_personam, against Wallach himself and
FIELD,

not against his property. As to the fee,
they now expressly declined to say
whether it had been in the United State,
or the purchaser, after confiscation.
Therefore, between the dates of decree
and sale, it must have been in the United
States, according to this deliverance.
Nothing was said about its possibly
being in abeyance, or in nubius, as in
the present case. But the Couit certainly held, in the Wallac case, that
the fee was out of him, by the confiscation. That case was briefly re-affirmed
in Chaffraixv. Shif (1875), 92 U.S.
214.

Passing Windsor v. Me Peigh (1876),
93 U. S. 274, and Gregory v. Mce-eigh
(1876), Id. 284, which followed the
criminal theory, and held (contrary to
established international law), that an
enemy has judicial standing in a court
while yet fighting to destroy it, we come
to Pike v. Wassel (1876), 94 U. S. 711,
confessedly modeled on the Walladc
case. The Court said that the confiscation of Pike's land, "without any doubt,
vested it in the United States, or the
2nurchaser," at the Government sale;
and that Pike's creditors could not make
their money out of any property right
left in Pike to that land. The reason
given in the Wallach case, that if the
fee bad been left in the enemy, he might
yet use it to further rebellion against the
Government, was inapplicable to the
position of creditors who sought to make
their money. If the feewas in nubibus,
that circumstance would weigh against
the innocent creditors, presumably loyal,
and in favor of the enemy debtor. Hiding one's effects in the clouds to defeat
attachment, is something novel. if the
land itself had not been confiscated, but
only an uncertain, precarious usufruct,
as the Court now say, why should it not
have remained liable to execution for
Pike's debts immediately, with reservation of the usufructuary right? The
"abeyance," which the Court recognizes
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in the case under review, would have
saved Bosworth from his creditors till
he got his pardon, and left him exposed
to them afterwards.
Knote v. United States (1877), 95 U.
S. i49: The effect of pardon, as to the
proceeds of confiscated property covered
into the treasury, was the point of this
decision; and it was held that the pardoned enemy could not recover it,
though the criminal theory was reavowed.
In Burbank v. Conrad (1877), 96
U. S. 291, the theory that the confiscation proceedings in rem were criminal
proceedings in bersonam, prevailed;
and the Court departed from the rule in
The Confscation Cases, SliddPs Land
and Conrad'sLots, supra,and now held
that the naming of the enemy owner in
the libel, is not merely to describe the
property proceeded against, but to make
him a party; and that if the res belonged
to another, the latter would not be
"remediless," should he fail to intervene, as had been held unanimously in
the Semmes case. But in Burbank v.
Semes (1878), 99 U. S. 138 (the next
case on the subject), the opposite theory
prevails; the Court follow the statute;
the proceedings are held to have been
civil,.against property, etc.
French v. Wade (188o), 102 U. S.
132, was almost precisely like the case
now under review. Wade's land was
confiscated and sold, and French acquired the Government's title, and also
bought wha:ever right remained in
Wade-just as the Railroad Co. bought
both titles in the Bosworth land. The
facts of these two cases, and Wallach v.
Van Riswick, run together on all fours.
The Court said: "By the condemnation
and sale, Wade's estate was separated
entirely from that of his heirs after his
death, and the heirs are not estopped,
by his warranty, from asserting their
title."
I do not know what that means.

Nemo plus commodi heredisto relin9uet
quam ipse habuit.
The Court said: "As to him, the forfeiture was complete and absolute; but
the ownership after his death was in no
wise affected, except by placing it beyond his control while living." If "the
forfeiture was complete and absolute,"
how could *Wade,holding the price of
the fee in his pocket, yet have the fee
simple title stored away in the clouds,
to be brought down to him at death, or
on being pardoned for apersonal crime?
And if the "forfeiture was complete,"
etc:, how can the heirs take from him
"by inheritance," as the Court said they
did, in this very case ? If, "as to him,"
the forfeiture was complete, as to everybody else it must have been so, since it
is conceded that he had held the fee,
and no other rights appear in any one
else.
In Kirk v. Lynd (1882), io6 U. S.
315, where the condemnation was under
the Act of i86I (12 Stat. at Large 319),
the Court distinguished between that
Act, and the Act of 1862 (12 Stat. at
Large 589), and held that the fee had
been confiscated because the property
had been usedfor hostile purposes, while
under the latter Act, property is proceeded against because of its having the
enemy character, and therefore it was
concluded that the object was to punish
the enemy as an offender. The proceedings under both confiscation statutes
were in rem, as both required: but the
Court did not-see that the Government's
jus in re arises from the enemy character of property, as clearly as from the
hostile use of property. Examples may
be given in prize proceedings in rein.
A professedly neutral ship, caught in
deliet---running a blockade for instance
-is condemned for hostility done by a
thing, while a ship captured in mid
ocean, may be condemned, if an enemy
vessel, though nothing hostile has been
done in, with, orby it. This principle
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was recognized in Semmes v. U. S.
General pardon was granted to all
sepra, and other cases above noticed.
who had committed the crimes of treaThis oversight of the Supreme Court, son and rebellion, by proclamation ia
1868, which is printed in the opinion:
as to the jus in re, was the pebble that
why then could not all living persons,
turned the stream of decisions the wrong
way, and caused the Court to treat civil who had .had lands confiscated under
proceedings as criminal; proceedings
the Act of 1862, immediately have
in rem as inpersonam; confiscation of power to sell or devise the fee, subject
to the life usufruct awarded by the
enemy property under the law of nations limited by statute, as a prosecuSupreme Court to the purchaser? Why,
from that date, could not creditors attion for the punishment of an offender,
tach the interest of such a person for
whether citizen or alien. This is all
virtually acknowledged by the Court in
debt, in a suit against him?
Kirk v. Zynd.
It is well settled that pardon is perIn Avegno v. Schmidt (I885), 113
sonal and does not affect property forU.S. 293, and Shields v. Sckhf (1888),
feited as a fictitiously guilty thing, or
124 Id. 351, the Court followed the
confiscated as a fictitiously hostile thing,
Wallach, Pike and French cases, and
by proceedings in rem-againstit. The
held that nothing was left in the former
Supreme Court, to take Bosworth's land.
enemy owner (or "offender," as their
out of the general rule, had to treat the
theory has it), which he could convey by four confiscation sections of the Act of
deed, will, or in any way, with no refer1862, as providing for the conviction of
ence to the effect of their previously retraitors without indictment, arrest, jury
ceived pardons for treason. They held, or any personal trial,'in order to make
under the authority of Day v. -iMiccu, the joint Resolution apply. Butguere?
and .lfarcuard'sIntervention, that the Are we now to understand tht the
default of a mortgagee, and final judg- constitutional provision, requiring aperment as res adjudicata (quoadomnes)
sonal trial for treason, is abrogated?
was of no effect-contrary to Semmes
It would seem that the questions touchv. U. S. on the same point, as well as ing the whereabouts of the fee simple
in the teeth of the statute above cited.
of confiscated property, dre'themselves
In this last case, IlL. Cent. R. 2. Co. v.
in ntbibius. It is clear enough, .howBos'orth'sHeirs, the criminal theory is ever, that the Court was right in reversreiterated; some twenty different times
ing the decision below, for the railroad
the Court applies criminal terms to Boscompany, which bought the property
worth, (though he may have been an, from Edgar, who had bought of Bur-'
alien not capable of treason, so far as bank, (the purchaser of the property at
the record shows) and to the civil pro- the confiscation sale), had acquired the
ceedings against his property (charged
ownership of it: Zillerv. U. S. (IS 7 i),
in the libel as enemy property,) such
I x Wall. (78 U. S.) 292; Tylerv. Determs as "offenders," "offense,? "confrees (1871), Id. 331 ; Semmes v. U. S.
viction," "punishment," "pardon," etc.,
(1875), 91 U. S. 21 ; Confiscation Cases
etc., are repeatedly employed; but the
(1874), 20 Wall. (86 U. S.) 92; all of
point of the decision is that the fee of
which (the Court still cites with apconfiscated property, under the Act of proval,) sustain confiscation.
1862, is in abeyance till the "offender ".
RuSs
WAPLES.
(the bereft enemy), be dead or par-,
doned, when it becomes vested in him
Ann Arbor, Mich.
or his heirs, eo instanti.

